139 
F66em£ 


OF  ILLINOIS 
LIBRARY 


e 


The  Cost  of  Manikins. — For  the  benefit  of  prospective  lec¬ 
turers  on  Physiology,  who  may  be  desirous  of  obtaining 
suitable  apparatus,  with  which  to  illustrate  the  subject,  we 
l*ave  obtained  the  following  particulars  with  regard  to  the 
cost  of  a  suitable  cabinet. 

Manikins  of  the  best  quality  can  only  be  obtained  from 
France.  They  are  no  where  else  manufactured  with  any 
thing  like  the  same  degree  of  perfection.  The  different 
sizes  and  prices  are  as  follows.  The  smallest  size,  about 
eighteen  inches  high,  may  be  had  at  $90.00. 

The  second  size,  four  feet  high,  with  seventeen  hundred 
objects,  at  $350.00. 

Same  size,  with  twelve  hundred  objects,  for  $200. 

The  third  size,  six  feet  high,  with  twelve  hundred  objects, 
$400. 

Same  size,  with  seventeen  hundred  objects,  $950. 

French  skeletons,  wired,  ready  for  use,  may  be  had 
at  prices  ranging  from  $26  to  $50. 

The  time  usually  required  to  import  these  articles  by 
steamer  from  Paris,  is  usually  from  six  to  eight  weeks. 
Payment  is  always  required  at  the  time  of  purchase. 

Besides  the  manikin,  and  skeleton,  a  set  of  Anatomical 
Drawings,  the  size  of  life,  representing  every  part  of  the 
human  body,  colored  and  mounted,  may  be  had  in  IJe-# 
York  at  $25.  A  complete  set  is  composed  of  ele’ven  figures, 
and,  inufif  absence  of  other  specimens,  will  serve  well,  in 
the  lecture-room,  to  illustrate  physiology  and  anatomy. 

These  drawings  should  be  placed  in  the  office  of  every 
physician,  of  whatever  faith  or  practice.  Schools  and  col¬ 
leges  should  also  be  supplied.  If  it  be  interesting  to  con¬ 
sult  a  map  of  a  state,  or  the  world,  it  surely  cannot  be  less 
useful  to  study  a  map  of  the  human  body,  with  all  its  bones, 
muscles,  nerves,  arteries,  veins,  fibres,  and  other  organs. 
Let  us  study  the  geography  of  ourselves. 


* 


mcretions,  and  may  be  relieved  bydlie  geiliiid!  iMJUllliehl 
?o  invigorate  the  skin  as  much  as  possible,  and  the  strict 
avoidance  of  all  alkaline,  saline,  or  earthy  matter  in  the 
[food.  Even  common  salt  is  bad  for  you. 

Neuralgia. — S.F.,  Columbia  ><!  Roads,  Pa.  “Please pre¬ 
scribe  a  course  of  home-treatment  for  neuralgia  in  the  hip.” 
[This  is  probably  what  is  called  “Sciatica.”  A  tepid  half- 
ibath  daily,  the  wet  sheet  pack  for  an  hour  every  other 
|day,  and  the  dry  pack  an  hour  and  a  half  on  the  alternate  day, 
;ach  followed  by  the  tepid  half-bath,  a  dripping-sheet,  are  the 
leading  bathing  appliances  we  have  found  most  successful. 

t  ^  v 

5ut  all  this  will  fail  without  a  rigidly  plain  and  simple  diet. 

Stricture  of  the  Rectum. — A.  S.,  Iowa.  The  case  you  de¬ 
scribe  as  having  terminated  fatally,  could,  no  doubt,  have  \ 
ieen  radically  cured  in  a  good  Water-cure  establishment  in  • 
few  months. 

Sore  Throat. — D.  M.,  Andover.  Tell  your  friend  to  quit 
lis  nitrate  of  silver  cauterizings,  and  all  other  druggery,  if 
le  does  not  wish  to  have  the  inflammation  of  the  larynx 
terminate  in  fatal  consumption  of  the  lungs.  The  proper 
treatment  is  given  in  the  Encyclopaedia,  under  the  head  of 
iBronchitis. 

Deafness  wira  Mismexstruatiox. — M.  S.  B.,  Mass.  Treat 
[the  latter  disease  especially,  and  with  its  cure  the  former  will 
[probably  disappear.  Half-baths  at  80°,  hip-baths  about 
70°,  and  foot-baths  about  G0°,  are  the  best  water  appliances. 
[Wear  the  wet  girdle  also,  and  adopt  the  coarsest  kind  of  a 
plain  vegetable  diet. 


.Hoarseness  and  Sore  Throat. — “  A  Sufferer,”  Orange.  X.  Y. 

bronchitis  ;  and  as  that 


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PHRENOLOGY  EXAMINED. 


PHRENOLOGY  EXAMINED. 


BY  P.  FLOURENS, 


MEMBER  OF  THE  FRENCH  ACADEMY,  PERPETUAL  SECRETARY  OF  THE  ROYAL  ACADEMY 
OF  SCIENCES  (INSTITUTE  OF  FRANCE),  MEMBER  OF  THE  ROYAL  SOCIETIES  OF 
LONDON  AND  EDINBURG,  OF  THE  ROYAL  ACADEMY  OF  SCIENCES  OF 
STOCKHOLM,  OF  MUNICH,  AND  OF  TURIN,  ETC.  ETC. 

PROFESSOR  OF  COMPARATIVE  PHYSIOLOGY  AT  THE  NATURAL 
HISTORY  MUSEUM  AT  PARIS. 


“J’ai  un  sentiment  clair  de  ma  liberte.” 

BOSSUET,  Traite  du  Libre  Arbitre. 


Translated  from  the  Second  Edition  of  1845,  by 

/ 

CHARLES  DE  LUCENA  MEIGS,  M.  D. 


MEMB.  AMER.  PHIL.  80C.  ETC.  ETC. 


PHILADELPHIA : 

HOGAN  &  THOMPSON. 

1846. 


Entered  according-  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  tear  1S45, 

By  CHARLES  D.  MEIGS,  M.  D. 

in  the  Clerk’s  Office  of  the  District  Court  for  the  Eastern 

District  of  Pennsylvania. 


;  ' 

-J 

I  XT 

r' 


TO 


DR.  JAMES  JACKSON, 

OF  BOSTON. 

My  dear  sir  : 

Perhaps  I  have  taken  too  great  a  liberty  in 
sending  to  you  in  this  public  manner,  and  in 
praying  you  to  accept  a  copy  of  M.  Flourens’ 
ingenious  work.  I  have  a  very  sincere  desire 
that  you  should  read  the  Inquiry ;  for  I  feel 
vs,  sure,  that  if  you  approve  of  it,  the  studious 
'  portion  of  our  countrymen  who  may  peruse  it, 

.  I  will  concur  in  the  opinion  of  a  gentleman  so 
^justly  distinguished  as  yourself  in  every  good 

;  word  and  work,  and  so  capable  of  judging  as 

A) 

I  f  370813 


VI 


to  the  salutary  or  evil  tendency  of  the  produc¬ 
tions  of  our  teeming  press. 

Inasmuch  as  many  of  our  countrymen  have 
heretofore  felt,  and  many  do  now  feel,  desirous 
to  know  the  truth  as  to  the  question  of  the 
multiple  nature  of  the  human  mind,  I  have 
here  translated  the  Examination,  in  order  that 
they  might  have  an  opportunity  to  learn  what 
is  thought  of  Gall’s  doctrines  by  one  of  the 
best  and  most  precise  thinkers  in  Europe. 

Professor  Flourens,  by  his  writings  on  the 
brain  and  nervous  system,  by  his  courses  of 
lectures  at  the  Jardin  des  Plantes,  by  numerous 
writings  on  various  scientific  subjects,  by  his 
position  in  the  Institute,  has  acquired  a  place 
among  the  literary  and  scientific  celebrities  of 
the  present  age.  The  amiable  and  elegant 
manners,  and  the  fine  disposition  of  this  dis¬ 
tinguished  character,  coincide  with  his  acknow¬ 
ledged  learning,  and  exactness,  and  zeal,  to 
accumulate  upon  him  the  public  respect  and 


Vll 


esteem.  It  is  therefore  with  great  confidence 
that  I  present  to  you  this  copy  of  his  criticism 
upon  Phrenology,  since  I  suppose  that  every 
writing  of  so  good  a  man  might  prove  accept¬ 
able  to  you,  and  to  the  studious  portion  of  our 
countrymen  generally. 

I  invoke  your  approbation  of  what  I  cannot 
but  deem  a  masterly  criticism  of  the  doctrines 
of  Gall.  So  highly  have  I  appreciated  it,  that 
I  cannot  readily  suppose  it  possible  to  rise 
from  its  perusal,  without  being  convinced  that 
Gall  was  wholly  mistaken  in  his  views  of 
the  human  mind ;  and  of  course,  that  all  the 
cranioscopists,  mesmerizers,  and  diviners,  who 
have  followed  his  track,  or  risen  up  on  the 
basis  of  his  opinions,  are  equally  in  error. 

In  order  to  have  a  just  view  of  human 
responsibility,  it  is  indispensable  to  entertain 
the  justest  notions  of  the  nature  of  the  human 
mind.  If  Phrenology  be  an  unsubstantial 
hypothesis ,  no  phrenologist  is  fit  to  be  a 


Vlll 


juror,  a  judge,  or  a  legislator:  for  since  all 
human  law — the  whole  social  compact — and 
indeed  all  divine  law,  as  relative  to  human 
propensities  and  actions — is  founded  on  some 
real  nature  of  the  soul  and  mind,  there  is  risk 
that  manifestly  erroneous  conceptions  of  the 
free-will,  of  the  conscience,  of  the  judgment, 
and  the  perceptive  powers,  &c.  may  mislead 
the  juror,  the  judge,  and  the  legislator,  in  their 
vote,  their  opinion,  and  their  notion  of  rights 
and  wrongs. 

If  I  am  correct  in  entertaining  these  appre¬ 
hensions  as  to  the  influence  of  false  metaphy¬ 
sics  on  the  public  characters  I  have  enumerated, 
there  is  abundant  cause  to  rejoice  when  a  blow 
is  struck,  like  that  pulverizing  blow  which  is 
given  in  this  work,  to  so  considerable  an  error. 
There  are  thousands  among  the  young  and 
ardent  and  curious  of  our  countrymen  and 
countrywomen,  whose  minds  may  be  likewise 
led  astray  from  the  truth ;  but  if  it  be  mis- 


IX 


chievous  for  the  judge  and  the  juror  and  the 
legislator  to  entertain  erroneous  views  upon 
the  nature  of  the  understanding,  the  mind, 
or  the  soul,  it  is  equally  to  be  deprecated 
where  the  error  is  sown  broadcast  in  the  land. 

Tares,  if  not  in  themselves  poisonous,  serve 
at  best  to  choke  up  the  useful  or  beautiful 
plants  that  ought  to  be  cultivated  in  the  fields 
of  science  or  morals;  but  you  will  find  that 
M.  Flourens  regards  them  as  poisons. 

Has  not  M.  Flourens  clearly  refuted  the 
phrenologists  ?  and  has  he  not,  in  doing  so, 
performed  a  useful  and  an  acceptable  service  ? 

I  pray  you  to  believe  that  I  am,  with  the 
most  grateful  respect  and  the  sincerest  esteem, 
Your  obliged  and  faithful  servant, 

CHARLES  D.  MEIGS. 


Philadelphia,  Dec.  10,  1845. 


* 


*»  *1 

'  f  ■  ■ 


A  * 


< 


TO 

THE  MEMORY 


DESCARTES. 


'  .*7 

■  4’ 


* 


•>* 


. 


■»  .  .dll 


<4  ,  • 


* 


if- 


.  * 

*  ' 


AUTHOR’S  PREFACE. 


Having  been  a  witness  to  the  progress  of 
phrenology,  I  was  led  to  the  composition  of 
the  following  treatise. 

Each  succeeding  age  has  a  philosophy  of 
its  own. 

The  seventeenth  century  recovered  from 
the  philosophy  of  Descartes ;  the  eighteenth 
recovered  from  that  of  Locke  and  Condillac: 
is  the  nineteenth  to  recover  from  that  of  Gall  ? 

This  is  a  really  important  question. 

I  propose,  in  this  work,  to  examine  phreno¬ 
logy  as  it  appears  in  the  writings  of  Gall, 
of  Spurzheim,  and  of  Broussais. 


XIV 


My  wish  is  to  be  brief.  There  is,  however, 

one  great  secret  in  the  art  of  being  brief: 
it  is  to  be  clear. 

I  frequently  quote  Descartes:  I  even  go 
further;  for  I  dedicate  my  work  to  his  me¬ 
mory.  I  am  writing  in  opposition  to  a  bad 
philosophy,  while  I  am  endeavouring  to  recall 
a  sound  one. 


CONTENTS. 


I.  Of  Gall. — Of  his  doctrine  in  general . 17 

II.  Of  Gall. — Of  the  faculties . 47 

III.  Of  Gall. — The  organs . 59 

IV.  Of  Spurzheim . 96 

V.  Of  Broussais . 115 

VI.  Broussais’s  Psycology . 121 

VII.  Broussais’s  Physiology . 125 

VIII.  Of  Gall . 127 

Note  I.  Anatomical  relations  supposed  by  Gall  to  exist 
between  the  organs  of  the  external  senses  and 
the  organs  of  the  intellectual  faculties  .  .  .131 

II.  Difference  between  instinct  and  understanding  .  133 

III.  Gall  as  an  observer . 137 

IV.  The  animal  spirits . 139 

V.  Exageration  of  Broussais,  even  in  phrenology  .  .  140 

VI.  Contractility  of  Broussais . 142 

VII  Real  labours  of  Gall  as  to  the  brain . 143 


I. 


OP  GALL. 


OF  HIS  DOCTRINE  IN  GENERAL. 


The  great  work  in  which  Gall  sets  forth  his 
doctrine  is  well  known.*  That  work  shall 
serve  as  the  groundwork  of  my  examination. 
I  shall  examine  in  succession  each  of  the 
questions  studied  by  the  author;  merely  intro¬ 
ducing  some  slight  changes  in  the  order  in 
which  they  are  arranged. 


*  Anatomie  et  Physiologie  du  systeme  nerveux  en  general, 
et  du  cerveau  en  particulier,  avec  des  observations  sur  la  possi¬ 
bility  de  reconnaitre  plusieurs  dispositions  intellectuelles  et 
morales  de  l’homme  et  des  animaux  par  la  configuration  de 
leurs  tetes;  4  vol.  4to,  avec  planches.  Paris,  de  1810  a  1819. 

2 


18 


The  entire  doctrine  of  Gall  is  contained  in 
two  fundamental  propositions,  of  which  the 
first  is,  that  understanding  resides  exclusively 
in  the  brain,  and  the  second,  that  each  parti¬ 
cular  faculty  of  the  understanding  is  provided 
in  the  brain  with  an  organ  proper  to  itself. 

Now,  of  these  two  propositions,  there  is 
certainly  nothing  new  in  the  first  one,  and 
perhaps  nothing  true  in  the  second  one. 

Let  us  commence  our  examination  with  the 
first  proposition. 

I  say  that  in  the  first  proposition,  namely, 
that  the  brain  is  the  exclusive  seat  of  the  under¬ 
standing,  there  is  nothing  new.  Gall  himself 
admits  this  to  be  the  case. 

“  For  a  long  time,”  says  he,  “both  philoso¬ 
phers  and  physiologists,  as  well  as  physicians, 
have  contended  that  the  brain  is  the  organ 
of  the  soul.”*  The  opinion  that  the  brain, 

*  T.  ii.  p.  217.  “It  is  generally  understood,”  says  he  further, 
“  that  the  brain  is  the  peculiar  organ  of  the  soul.”  T.  ii.  p.  14. 


19 


(as  a  whole,  or  such  and  such  parts  of  the 
brain  considered  separately,)  is  the  seat  of 
the  soul,  is,  in  fact,  as  old  as  learning  itself. 
Descartes  placed  the  soul  in  the  pineal  gland , 
Willis  in  the  corpora  striata ,  Lapeyronie  in 
the  corpus  callosum ,  &c.  &c. 

As  to  the  more  recent  authorities,  Gall  quotes 
Soemmerring,  who  says  precisely  that,  “  the 
brain  is  the  exclusive  instrument  of  all  sensa¬ 
tion,  all  thought,  and  all  will,”*  &c.  He  quotes 
Haller,  who  proves  (proves  is  the  very  expres¬ 
sion  made  use  of  by  Gall  himself,)  that  “  sen¬ 
sation  does  not  take  place  at  the  point  where 
the  object  touches  the  nerve,  the  point  where 
the  impression  is  made,  but  in  the  brain. ”t 
He  might  have  quoted  many  other  authorities 
to  the  same  effect. 

Were  not  Cabanis’s  writings  anterior  to  the 

*  Gall,  t.  ii.  p.  221. 

f  Gall,  t.  ii.  p.  222.  Haller,  Elem.  Physiolog.  etc.,  t.  iv. 
p.  304.  Sensus  prseterea  sedem  in  cerebro  esse,  atque  ad 
cerebrum  per  nervos  mandari,  alia  sunt  quse  ostendunt. 


20 


time  of  Gall  ?  and  did  not  he  say,  “  In  order 
to  obtain  a  just  idea  of  those  operations  whose 
result  is  thought,  the  brain  must  be  considered 
as  a  peculiar  organ  designed  to  produce  it,  just 
as  the  stomach  and  the  bowels  are  designed 
to  produce  digestion,  the  liver  to  secrete  the 
bile,”  &c.  ?*  a  proposition  so  extravagant  as 
to  become  almost  ridiculous,  but  which  is  in 
truth  the  very  proposition  of  Gall  himself, 
except  as  to  some  exaggeration  in  the  terms 
employed. 

Antecedently  to  the  time  of  Gall,  both 
Soemmerring  and  Cuvier,  in  the  comparative 
anatomy  of  the  various  classes  of  animals, 
had  investigated  the  ratio  existing  between 
the  development  of  the  encephalon  and  that 
of  the  intellectual  power.  The  following  re¬ 
markable  phrase  is  from  the  pen  of  Cuvier: 
“  The  proportion  of  the  brain  to  the  medulla 

*  Rapports  du  Physique  et  du  Moral  de  Thomme,  IIe  Me- 
moire,  §  vii. 


21 


oblongata,  a  proportion  which  is  greater  in 
man  than  in  all  other  animals,  is  a  very  good 
index  of  the  perfection  of  the  creature’s  intelli¬ 
gence,  because  it  is  the  best  index  of  the  pre¬ 
eminence  of  the  organs  of  reflection  above 
the  organs  of  the  external  senses.”*  And  this 
other  still  more  remarkable  phrase  :  “  In  ani¬ 
mals  the  intelligence  appears  to  be  greater  in 
proportion  as  the  volume  of  the  hemispheres 
is  greater.”! 

Gall,  in  an  especial  manner,  contends  against 
the  assertion  of  Bichat,  who  remarks  that  “The 
influence  of  the  passions  is  exerted  invariably 
upon  the  organic  life,  and  not  upon  the  animal 
life  ;  all  the  signs  that  characterise  them  are 
referable  to  the  former  and  not  to  the  latter. 
Gestures,  which  are  the  mute  exponents  of  the 
sentiments  and  the  understanding,  afford  a  re¬ 
markable  proof  of  this  truth.  When  we  wish 

*  Legons  d’Anat.  Comp.  t.  ii.  p.  153. 

|  Ibid.  p.  173. 


22 


to  signify  something  relative  to  the  memory, 
the  imagination,  to  our  perception,  to  the 
judgment,  &c.  the  hand  moves  involuntarily 
towards  the  head :  if  we  wish  to  express  love, 
joy,  grief,  hatred,  it  is  directed  towards  the  re¬ 
gion  of  the  heart,  the  stomach,  or  the  bowels.”* 
Doubtless,  there  is  much  that  might  be  criti¬ 
cised  in  the  foregoing  words  of  Bichat ;  never¬ 
theless,  to  say  that  the  passions  expend  their 
influences  upon  the  organic  life,  is  not  the  same 
thing  as  to  say  that  they  reside  or  exist  there. 
Bichat  had  already  remarked,  that  “  Every 
species  of  sensation  has  its  centre  in  the  brain, 
for  sensation  always  supposes  both  impression 
and  perception.”!  Furthermore,  regarding  this 
distinction,  (which  as  yet  has  not  been  drawn 
with  sufficient  clearness,)  between  the  parts 
that  are  the  seats  of  the  passions,  and  the  parts 
that  are  affected  by  their  action,  Gall  might 

*  Recherches  Phys.  sur  la  Vie  et  la  Mort,  art  vi.  §  ii. 

t  Ibid. 


23 


have  found  in  Descartes  the  following  remark, 
which  is  not  less  judicious  than  acute. 

“ Although,”  says  he,  writing  to  Leroy,  “the 
spirits  that  move  the  muscles  come  from  the 
brain,  we  must,  nevertheless,  assign  as  seats  of 
the  passions,  the  places  that  are  most  consider¬ 
ably  affected  by  them ;  hence,  I  say,  the  prin¬ 
cipal  seat  of  the  passions,  as  far  as  they  relate 
to  the  body,  is  the  heart,  because  it  is  the  heart 
that  is  most  sensibly  affected  by  them ;  but 
their  place  is  in  the  brain,  in  as  far  as  they 
affect  the  soul,  for  the  soul  cannot  suffer  imme¬ 
diately,  otherwise  than  through  the  brain.”* 

As  I  am  quoting  Descartes,  who,  I  ask,  more 
clearly  than  Descartes  has  perceived  that  the 
soul  can  have  only  a  very  circumscribed  seat 
in  the  economy,  and  that  that  circumscribed 
seat  is  the  brain  itself? 

“We  know,”  says  he,  “that,  properly  speak- 

*  Descartes,  Lettre  a  Kegius  ou  Leroy,  t.  viii.  p.  515,  edit,  par 
M.  Cousin. 


24 


ing,  it  is  not  inasmuch  as  the  soul  is  in  the 
members  that  serve  as  organs  to  the  exterior 
senses,  that  the  soul  feels,  but  inasmuch  as  she 
is  in  the  brain,  where  she  exercises  the  faculty 
denominated  common  sense.”* 

He  elsewhere  observes :  “  Surprise  is  ex- 

% 

pressed  because  I  do  not  recognise  any  other 
point  of  sensation  except  that  which  exists  in 
the  brain ;  but  all  physicians  and  surgeons 
will,  I  hope,  assist  me  in  proving  this  point, 
for  they  are  aware  of  the  common  fact  that  a 
person  who  has  been  subjected  to  amputation 
of  a  limb,  continues  to  feel  pain  in  a  part  that 
he  no  longer  possesses.”! 

Here  then,  according  to  Descartes,  we  find 
that  the  soul  is  situated,  that  is  to  say,  feels  in 
the  brain,  and  only  in  the  brain.  The  follow¬ 
ing  passage  shows  with  what  precision  he 

*  T.  v.  p.  34.  “  I  remark,”  says  he  again,  “  that  the  mind 

does  not  receive  the  impression  from  all  parts  of  the  body,  but 
from  the  brain  only.” — T.  i.  p.  344. 

f  T.  vi.  p.  347. 


25 


excluded  even  the  external  senses  from  any 
participation  with  the  functions  of  the  soul. 

“I  have  shown,”  says  he,  “that  size,  dis¬ 
tance,  and  form  are  perceived  only  by  the 
reason;  and  that,  by  deducing  them  the  one 
from  the  other.”* 

“  I  cannot  agree  with  the  assertion  that  this 
error  (the  error  caused  by  the  bent  appear¬ 
ance  of  a  stick  partly  plunged  into  water,)  is 
not  corrected  by  the  understanding  but  by  the 
touch;  for,  although  the  sense  in  question 
makes  us  judge  that  the  stick  is  straight,  yet 
that  cannot  correct  the  error  of  vision;  but 
furthermore,  it  is  requisite  that  reason  should 
teach  us  to  confide,  in  this  case,  rather  to  our 
judgment  after  touching,  than  to  the  judgment 
that  we  come  to  after  using  our  eyes ;  but  this 
reason  cannot  be  attributed  to  the  sense,  but 
to  the  understanding  alone ;  and  in  this  very 


*  T.  ii.  p.  357. 


26 


example,  it  is  the  understanding  that  corrects 
the  error  of  the  sense.”* 

The  brain,  then,  is  the  exclusive  seat  of  the 
soul ;  and  all  sensation,  even  those  operations 
that  appear  to  depend  upon  the  simple  external 
sense,  is  function  of  the  soul. 

Gall  falls  back  upon  Condillac,  who,  much 
less  rigorous  in  this  particular  than  Descartes, 
says,  that  “all  our  faculties  proceed  from 
the  senses.”!  But  when  Condillac  speaks 
thus,  he  evidently  speaks  by  ellipsis,  for  he 
immediately  adds  these  words :  “  The  senses 
are  only  occasional  causes.  They  do  not  feel ; 
it  is  the  soul  that  alone  feels,  through  the 
medium  of  the  organs.”f 

Now,  if  it  be  the  soul  only  that  feels,  a 


*  T.  ii.  p.  358. 

|  “The  piincipal  object  of  this  work,”  says  he,  “is  to  show 
how  all  our  knowledge,  and  all  our  faculties  come  from  the 
senses.” — Traite  des  Sensations,  preambule  de  l'Extrait  Rai- 
sonne. 

$  Traite  des  Sensations,  pream.  de  TExtrait  Raisonne. 


27 


fortiori ,  it  is  the  soul  only  that  remembers ,  that 
judges ,  that  imagines,  &c.  Memory,  judg¬ 
ment,  imagination,  &c.,  in  a  word,  all  our 
faculties,  are  therefore  of  the  soul,  and  therefore 
come  from  the  soul,  and  not  from  the  senses. 

There  is  no  philosopher  who  has  exagge¬ 
rated  more  than  Helvetius  the  influence  of  the 
senses  upon  the  intelligence.  But  Helvetius 
says,  “  In  whatsoever  manner  we  interrogate 
experience,  she  always  answers  that  any 
greater  or  lesser  superiority  of  mind  is  inde¬ 
pendent  of  any  greater  or  lesser  perfection  of 
the  senses.”* 

But  I  leave  Helvetius  and  Condillac,  and  I 
return  to  Descartes,  to  Willis,  to  Lapeyronie, 
to  Haller,  Soemmerring,  Cuvier,  &c.  They 
all  perceived  and  all  asserted  that  the  brain 
is  the  seat  of  the  soul,  and  that  it  is  so  to 
the  exclusion  of  the  senses.  Therefore,  the 

*  De  l’homme,  de  ses  facultes  intellectuelles,  etc.  t.  i.  p.  186. 
Liege,  1774. 


28 


proposition  that  the  brain  is  the  exclusive  seat 
of  the  soul  is  not  a  new  proposition,  and  hence 
does  not  originate  with  Gall.  It  belonged  to 
science  before  it  appeared  in  his  Doctrine. 
The  merit  of  Gall,  and  it  is  by  no  means  a 
slender  merit,  consists  in  his  having  understood 
better  than  any  of  his  predecessors  the  whole 
of  its  importance,  and  in  having  devoted  him¬ 
self  to  its  demonstration.  It  existed  in  science 
before  Gall  appeared — it  may  be  said  to  reign 
there  ever  since  his  appearance.  Taking  each 
particular  sense,  he  excluded  them  all,  one 
after  another,  from  all  immediate  participation 
in  the  functions  of  the  understanding.*  Far 
from  being  developed  in  the  direct  ratio  of  the 
intellection,  most  of  them  are  developed  in  an 
inverse  ratio.  Taste  and  smell  are  more  deve¬ 
loped  in  the  quadruped  than  in  man.  Sight 

*  He  very  properly  distinguishes  the  senses  from  the  under¬ 
standing  ;  but,  as  will  be  elsewhere  seen,  he  endows  each  sense 
with  all  the  attributes  of  the  understanding.  He  escapes  from 
one  error  only  to  fall  into  another. 


29 


and  hearing  are  more  so  in  the  bird  than  in  the 
quadruped.  The  brain  alone  is  in  all  classes 
developed  in  the  ratio  of  the  understanding. 
The  loss  of  a  sense  does  not  lead  to  the  loss  of 
the  intelligence.  The  understanding  survives 
the  loss  of  sight  and  hearing.  It  might  survive 
the  loss  of  all  the  senses.  To  interrupt  the 
communication  between  the  sense  and  the 
brain,  is  enough  to  insure  the  loss  of  the 
sense.  The  mere  compression  of  the  brain, 
which  abolishes  the  intellection,  abolishes  all 
the  senses.  Far,  therefore,  from  being  organs 
of  the  intelligence,  the  organs  of  the  senses  are 
not  even  organs  of  the  senses,  they  do  not  even 
exercise  their  functions  as  organs  of  the  senses, 
except  through  the  medium  of  the  intelligence, 
and  this  intelligence  resides  only  in  the  brain. 

The  brain  alone,  therefore,  is  the  organ  of 
the  soul ; — is  it  the  whole  brain — the  brain 
taken  en  masse?  Gall  thought  so,  and  Spurz- 
heim  followed  Gall’s  opinion;  and  all  the 


30 


phrenologists  who  have  come  after  them  have 
followed  the  examples  of  Gall  and  Spurzheim. 

Yet,  after  all,  it  amounts  to  nothing.  If  we 
deprive  an  animal  of  its  cerebellum,  it  loses 
only  its  locomotive  action.  If  we  deprive  it  of 
its  tubercula  quadrigemina,  it  loses  its  sight 
only ;  if  we  destroy  its  medulla  oblongata,  it 
loses  its  respiratory  movements,  and  in  conse¬ 
quence  thereof,  its  life.*  Neither  of  these  parts, 
therefore,  that  is  to  say,  the  cerebellum,  the 
tubercula  quadrigemina,  and  the  medulla  ob¬ 
longata,  is  the  organ  of  the  understanding. 

The  brain,  properly  so  called,  is  so,  and  it 
alone.  If  we  remove  from  an  animal  the 
brain,  properly  so  called,  or  the  hemispheres, 
it  immediately  loses  its  understanding,  and 
loses  nothing  but  its  understanding.! 

The  brain,  en  masse,  the  encephalon ,  is  then 

*  See  my  Recherches  Experimentales  sur  les  proprietes  et 
les  fonctions  du  Systeme  Nerveux,  2d  edit.  Paris,  1842. 

f  Ibid. 


31 


a  multiple  organ  ;  and  this  multiple  organ  con¬ 
sists  of  four  particular  organs :  the  cerebellum, 
the  seat  of  the  principle  that  regulates  the 
movements  of  locomotion ;  the  tubercula  quad- 
rigemina,  seats  of  the  principle  that  regulates 
the  sense  of  sight;  the  medulla  oblongata,  in 
which  resides  the  principle  that  determines  the 
respiratory  motions ;  and  the  brain  proper,  the 
seat,  and  the  exclusive  seat  of  the  intelligence.* 

Therefore,  when  the  phrenologists  promis¬ 
cuously  place  the  intellectual  and  moral  facul¬ 
ties  in  the  brain,  considered  en  masse,  they 
deceive  themselves.  Neither  the  cerebellum, 
the  quadrigeminal  tubercles,  nor  the  medulla 
oblongata  can  be  regarded  as  seats  of  these 
faculties.  All  these  faculties  dwell  solely  in  the 
brain,  properly  so  called,  or  the  hemispheres. 

The  question  as  to  the  precise  seat  of  the 
intelligence,  has  undergone  a  great  change 

*  See  my  Recherches  Experimentales  sur  les  proprietes  et 
Ies  fonctions  du  Systeme  Nerveux,  2d  edit.  Paris,  1842. 


32 


since  the  time  of  Gall.  Gall  believed  that  the 
intelligence  was  seated  indifferently  in  the 
whole  encephalon,  and  it  has  been  proved  that 
it  resides  only  in  the  hemispheres. 

Further,  it  is  not  the  encephalon  taken  en 
masse  that  is  developed  in  the  ratio  of  the  intel- 

4 

ligence  of  the  creature,  but  the  hemispheres. 
The  mammifera  are  the  animals  most  highly 
endowed  with  intelligence ;  they  have,  other 
things  being  equal,  the  most  voluminous  hemi¬ 
spheres.  Birds  are  the  animals  most  highly 
endowed  with  power  of  motion ;  their  cerebel¬ 
lum  is,  other  things  being  equal,  the  largest. 
Reptiles  are  the  most  torpid  and  apathetic  of 
animals ;  they  have  the  smallest  brain,  &c. 

Every  thing  concurs  then  to  prove,  that  the 
encephalon,  in  mass,  is  a  multiple  organ  with 
multiple  functions,  consisting  of  different  parts, 
of  which  some  are  destined  to  subserve  the 
locomotive  motions,  others  the  motions  of  the 
respiration,  &c.,  while  one  single  one,  the  brain 


33 


proper,  is  designed  for  the  purposes  of  the 
intellection. 

This  being  conceded,  it  is  evident  that  the 

1 

entire  brain  cannot  be  divided,  as  the  phreno¬ 
logists  divide  it,  into  a  number  of  small  organs, 
each  of  which  is  the  seat  of  a  distinct  intellec¬ 
tual  faculty ;  for  the  entire  brain  does  not  serve 
the  purposes  of  what  is  called  the  intelligence. 
The  hemispheres  alone  are  the  seats  of  the 
intellectual  power ;  and  consequently,  the  ques¬ 
tion  as  to  whether  the  organ,  the  seat  of  the 
intelligence  may  be  divided  into  several  distinct 
organs,  is  a  question  relative  solely  to  the  uses 
and  powers  of  the  hemispheres. 

Gall  avers,  and  this  is  the  second  funda¬ 
mental  proposition  of  his  doctrine,  that  the 
brain  is  divided  into  several  organs,  each  one 
of  which  lodges  a  particular  faculty  of  the 
soul.  By  the  word  brain ,  he  understood  the 
ichole  brain ,  and  he  thus  deceived  himself. 

Let  us  reduce  the  application  of  his  proposition 

3 


34 


to  the  hemispheres  alone,  and  we  shall  see 
that  he  has  deceived  himself  again. 

It  has  been  shown  by  my  late  experiments, 
that  we  may  cut  away,  either  in  front,  or 
behind,  or  above,  or  on  one  side,  a  very 
considerable  slice  of  the  hemisphere  of  the 
brain,  without  destroying  the  intelligence. 
Hence  it  appears,  that  quite  a  restricted 
portion  of  the  hemispheres  may  suffice  for 
the  purposes  of  intellection  in  an  animal.* 

On  the  other  hand,  in  proportion  as  these 
reductions  by  slicing  away  the  hemispheres 
are  continued,  the  intelligence  becomes  en¬ 
feebled,  and  grows  gradually  less ;  and  certain 
limits  being  passed,  is  wholly  extinguished. 
Hence  it  appears,  that  the  cerebral  hemi¬ 
spheres  concur,  by  their  whole  mass,  in  the 
full  and  entire  exercise  of  the  intelligence.! 


*  See  my  Recherches  Experimentales  sur  les  proprietes  et 
les  fonctions  du  Systeme  Nerveux. 
f  Ibid. 


35 


In  fine,  as  soon  as  one  sensation  is  lost,  all 
sensation  is  lost ;  when  one  faculty  disappears, 
all  the  faculties  disappear.  There  are  not, 
therefore,  different  seats  for  the  different  facul¬ 
ties,  nor  for  the  different  sensations.  The 
faculty  of  feeling,  of  judging,  of  willing  any 
thing,  resides  in  the  same  place  as  the  faculty 
of  feeling,  judging,  or  willing  any  other  thing, 
and  consequently  this  faculty,  essentially  a 
unit,  resides  essentially  in  a  single  organ.* 

The  understanding  is,  therefore,  a  unit. 
According  to  Gall,  there  are  as  many  par¬ 
ticular  kinds  of  intellect  as  there  are  distinct 
faculties  of  the  mind.  According  to  him,  each 
faculty  has  its  perception,  its  memory,  its 
judgment,  will,  &c.,  that  is  to  say,  all  the 
attributes  of  the  understanding,  properly  so 
called.t 

*  See  my  Recherches  Experimentales  sur  les  proprietes  et 
les  fonctions  du  Systeme  Nerveux. 

f  “  F rom  what  I  have  now  said,  it  dearly  follows  that  the 
aperceptive  faculty,  the  faculty  of  reminiscence,  and  that  of 


36 


“  All  the  intellectual  faculties,”  says  he,  “are 
endowed  with  the  perceptive  faculty,  with 
attention,  recollection,  memory,  judgment,  and 
imagination.”* 

Thus  each  faculty  perceives,  remembers, 
judges,  imagines,  compares,  creates;  but  these 
are  trifles — for  each  faculty  reasons.  “  When¬ 
ever,”  says  Gall,  “a  faculty  compares  and 
judges  of  the  relations  of  analogous  or  different 
ideas,  there  is  an  act  of  comparison,  there  is  an 
act  of  judgment:  a  sequence  of  comparisons 
and  judgments  constitutes  reasoning,”  &c.t 

Therefore,  each  and  every  faculty  is  an 
understanding  by  itself,  and  Gall  says  so  ex¬ 
pressly.  “There  are,”  says  he,  “as  many 
different  kinds  of  intellect  or  understanding  as 

memory,  are  nothing  but  attributes  common  to  all  the  funda¬ 
mental  faculties.” — Gall,  t.iv.  p.  319.  “  All  that  I  have  just  said, 
is  also  applicable  to  the  judgment  and  the  imagination,"  &c. — 
Ibid.  p.  325.  “  The  sentiments  and  the  propensities  also  have 

their  judgment,  their  imagination,  their  recollection,  and  their 
memory.” — Ibid.  p.  327. 

*  Ibid.  328. 


t  Ibid.  327. 


37 


there  are  distinct  faculties.”*  “Each  distinct 
faculty,”  says  he,  further,  “  is  intellect  or 
understanding  —  each  individual  intelligence 
(the  words  are  precise)  has  its  proper  organ. ”t 

But,  admitting  all  these  kinds  of  intellects , 

m 

all  these  individual  understandings ,  where 
are  we  to  seek  for  the  General  Intelligence,  the 
understanding,  properly  so  called  ?  It  must, 
as  you  may  please,  be  either  an  attribute  of 
each  faculty,!  or  the  collective  expression  of 
all  the  faculties,  or  even  the  mere  simple  result 
of  their  common  and  simultaneous  action  ;§  in 
one  word,  it  cannot  be  that  positive  and  single 
faculty  which  we  understand,  conceive  of,  and 
feel  in  ourselves,  when  we  pronounce  the 
word  soul  or  understanding. 

*  Gall.  t.  iv.  p.  339.  -j-  Ibid.  p.  341. 

4  “  The  intellectual  faculty  and  all  its  subdivisions,  such  as 
perception,  recollection,  memory,  judgment,  imagination,  &c. 
are  not  fundamental  faculties,  but  merely  general  attributes  of 
them.” — Gall,  t.  iv.  p.  327. 

§“  Reason,”  says  Gall,  “is  the  result  of  the  simultaneous 
action  of  all  the  intellectual  faculties.” — Gall,  t.  iv.  p.  341. 


38 


Now  here  is ‘the  sum  and  the  substance 
of  Gall’s  psycology.  For  the  understanding, 
essentially  a  unit  faculty,  he  substitutes  a 
multitude  of  little  understandings  or  faculties, 
distinct  and  isolate.  And,  as  these  faculties, 
which  perform  just  as  he  wills  them  to  do — 
which  he  multiplies  according  to  his  pleasure,* 
seem  in  his  eyes  to  explain  certain  phenomena 
which  are  not  well  explained  by  the  lights  of 
ordinary  philosophy,  he  triumphs  ! 

He  does  not  perceive  that  an  explanation, 
which  is  words  merely,  adapts  itself  to  any 
and  to  every  thing.  In  the  time  of  Male- 
branche,  every  thing  was  explained  by  animal 
spirits ;  Barthez  explained  every  thing  by  his 
vital  principle ,  &c. 

“This,”  says  Gall,  “explains  how  the  same 
man  may  possess  a  judgment  that  is  ready  and 
sure  as  to  certain  objects,  while  it  is  imbecile 

*  Gall  enumerates  twenty-seven  of  these  faculties,  Spurzheim 
enumerates  twenty-five,  &c. 


39 


as  to  certain  others;  how  he  may  have  the 
liveliest  and  most  fruitful  imagination  upon 
some  subjects,  while  it  is  cold  and  sterile  upon 
others.”* 

“  Grant,”  says  he,  further,  “  to  the  animals 
certain  fundamental  faculties,  and  you  have 
the  dog  that  follows  the  chase  with  passion; 
the  weasel  that  strangles  the  poultry  with 
rage;  the  nightingale  that  sings  with  fervour 
beside  his  mate,”t  &c. 

No  doubt  of  it.  But  what  sort  of  philosophy 
is  that,  that  thinks  to  explain  a  fact  by  a 
word?  You  observe  such  or  such  a  penchant 
in  an  animal,  such  or  such  a  taste  or  talent  in 
a  man ;  presto ,  a  particular  faculty  is  produced 
for  each  one  of  these  peculiarities,  and  you 
suppose  the  whole  matter  to  be  settled.  You 
deceive  yourself;  your  faculty  is  only  a  word , 
— it  is  the  name  of  the  fact, — and  all  the  diffi¬ 
culty  remains  just  where  it  was  before. 

*  Gall,  t.  iv.  p.  325.  f  Ibid.  p.  330. 


40 


Besides,  you  speak  only  of  the  facts  that  you 
suppose  yourself  able  to  explain ;  you  say 
nothing  of  those  that  you  render  by  your 
system  wholly  inexplicable.  You  say  not  one 
word  as  to  the  unity  of  the  understanding,  the 
unity  of  the  me,  or  you  deny  it.  But  the 
unity  of  the  understanding,  the  unity  of  the 
me ,  is  a  fact  of  the  conscious  sense,  and 
the  conscious  sense  is  more  powerful  than  all 
the  philosophies  together. 

Gall  is  always  talking  about  observation, 
and  he  was  indeed,  as  an  observer,  full  of 
ingenuity.  But,  in  order  to  follow  out  an 
observation,  it  must  be  traced  to  the  very 
end,  and  we  must  accept  all  that  it  yields  to 
our  research ;  and  observation  every  where 
gives,  and  shows  every  where,  and  above  all 
things  else,  the  unity  of  the  understanding,  the 
unity  of  the  me. 

Gall’s  philosophy  consists  only  in  trans¬ 
muting  into  a  particular  understanding  each 


41 


separate  mode*  of  the  understanding,  properly 
so  called. 

Descartes  had  already  said,  “  There  are  in 
us  as  many  faculties  as  there  are  truths  to  be 
known.  .  .  But  I  do  not  think  that  any  useful 
application  can  be  made  of  this  way  of  think¬ 
ing  ;  and  it  seems  to  me  rather  more  likely  to 
be  mischievous,  by  giving  to  the  ignorant 
occasion  for  imagining  an  equal  number  of 
little  entities  in  the  soul.”t 

It  may  well  be  supposed  that  Gall,  who  in 
the  word  understanding  sees  nothing  but  an 
abstract  word,  expressive  of  the  sum  of  our 
intellectual  faculties,  would  also,  in  the  word 
will,  perceive  nothing  more  than  an  abstract 
word,  expressing  the  sum  of  our  moral 
faculties, 

*  “  I  find  in  myself,”  says  Descartes,  “  divers  faculties  of 
thought,  that  have  each  their  own  way,  .  .  .  whence  I  conclude, 
they  are  distinct  from  me,  as  modes  are  distinct  from  things.” — 
T.  i.  p.  332. 
t  T.  viii.  p.  169. 


42 


He  had  given  a  definition  of  reason :  “  The 
result  of  the  simultaneous  action  of  all  the 
intellectual  faculties.”*  In  the  same  way  he 
defined  will  to  be  “  the  result  of  the  simul¬ 
taneous  action  of  the  superior  intellectual  facul- 
ties.”t  But  Gall  always  deceives  himself;  for 
reason  and  will  are  not  results — they  are 
powers ,  and  primary  powers  of  thought. 

Gall,  in  a  manner  equally  singular,  defines 
moral  liberty  or  free  will . 

“  Moral  liberty,”  says  he,  “  is  nothing  more 
than  the  faculty  of  being  determined ,  and  of 
determining  under  motive. Not  so  :  liberty 
is  precisely  the  power  to  determine  against  all 
motive.  Locke  well  defined  liberty  as  power: 
to  be  determined,  is  to  allow  one’s  self  to  be 
determined — that  is,  to  obey . 

Gall  says  again,  “  Unlimited  liberty  supposes 
not  only  that  man  governs  himself  indepen- 

*  Gall,  iv.  p.  341.  +  Ibid, 

t  Ibid,  t  ii.  p.  100. 


43 


dently  of  all  law,  but  that  he  is  the  creator  of 
his  own  nature.55*  Not  at  all;  it  supposes 
that  he  may  have  choice — and  in  fact  he  does 
choose. 

Lastly,  Gall  says,  “A  phenomenon  such 
as  that  of  absolute  liberty,  would  be  a  phe¬ 
nomenon  occurring  without  any  cause  what¬ 
ever.55!  Why  without  cause  ?  The  cause 
is  in  the  power  of  choosing — and  this  power 
is  a  fact. 

GalPs  whole  doctrine  is  one  series  of  errors, 
which  press  upon  each  other  cumulatively. 
He  resolves  that  the  part  of  the  brain  in  which 
the  understanding  resides  shall  be  divided  into 
many  small  organs,  distinct  from  each  other ; 
a  physiological  error.  He  decries  the  unity  of 
the  understanding,  and  looks  upon  the  will 
and  the  reason  as  mere  results — psycological 
errors.  In  the  free  will  he  perceives  merely  a 


*  Gall,  t.  ii.  p.  97. 


f  Ibid. 


44 


compulsory  determination,*  and  consequently 
a  mere  result — this  is  a  moral  error. 

Man’s  liberty  is  a  positive  faculty,  and  not 
the  simple  passive  result  of  the  preponderance 
of  one  motive  over  another  motive ,  of  one 
organ  over  another  organ. t 

Reason,  will,  liberty,  are  therefore,  not  as 
in  Gall’s  doctrine,  positive  faculties ,  active 
powers;  or  rather,  they  are  the  understand¬ 
ing  itself.  Reason,  will,  liberty,  are  in  fact 
the  understanding,  as  conceiving ,  willing , 
choosing ,  or  dcliberating.% 

The  consciousness  which  feels  itself  to  be 
one,  feels  itself  free.  And  you  will  remark, 
that  these  two  great  facts  given  out  by  the 

*  “  It  is  a  law  of  moral  liberty,  that  man  shall  be  always 
determined,  and  that  he  shall  himself  determine  from  the  most 
numerous  and  most  powerful  motives.” — T.  ii.  p.  137. 

j*  “But  an  organ  may  act  with  greater  energy,  and  furnish 
a  more  powerful  motive.” — T.  ii.  p.  104. 

t  “  There  is  no  person  who,  upon  contemplating  himself, 
does  not  feel  and  experience  that  will  and  liberty  are  one  and 
the  same ;  or  rather,  that  there  is  no  difference  between  that 
which  is  voluntary  and  that  which  is  free.” — T.  i.  p.  496. 


45 


inward  sense,  the  consciousness,  to  wit,  the 
unity  of  the  understanding  and  the  positive 
power  of  the  free  will,  are  precisely  the  two 
first  facts  denied  by  the  philosophy  of  Gall. 

And  take  good  care  to  observe  further,  that 

if  there  be  in  us  any  thing  that  belongs  to 

# 

the  consciousness ,  it  is  evidently  and  par 
excellence  the  sense  of  our  personal  unity ; 
or  what  is  more,  the  consciousness  of  our 
moral  liberty. 

Man  is  a  moral  force,  only  inasmuch  as  he 
is  a  free  force.  Any  philosophy  that  attempts 
the  liberty  of  man,  attempts,  without  knowing 
it,  morals  itself.  Man  then  is  free,  and  as  he 
is  a  moral  agent  only  in  proportion  as  he  is 
free,  it  would  seem  that  his  liberty  is  the  only 
attribute  of  his  soul  from  which  Providence 
has  designed  to  remove  all  the  boundaries. 

“What  is  here  very  remarkable,”  says 
Descartes,  “  is  that,  of  all  within  me,  there  is 
not  one  thing  so  perfect  or  so  great,  but  that 


46 


I  know  it  might  be  greater  and  more  perfect. 
Thus,  for  example,  if  I  consider  my  faculty  of 
conceiving,  I  find  it  of  very  small  extent,  and 
very  limited.  If,  in  the  same  manner,  I  exa¬ 
mine  the  memory,  the  imagination,  or  any 
other  one  of  my  faculties,  I  find  not  one  that  is 
not  very  limited  and  very  small.  Within  me 
there  is  only  my  will  or  my  liberty  of  free 
will,  which  I  feel  to  be  so  great  that  I  conceive 
not  the  idea  of  another  more  full  and  of 
greater  extent. ” 

*  Descartes,  t.  i.  p.  299.  “  It  is  always  in  our  power  to 

prevent  ourselves  from  pursuing  a  good  which  is  clearly  known 
to  us,  provided  we  should  think  it  a  good  to  show  in  that  way 
our  free  will.” — Descartes,  t.  vi.  p.  133.  “  The  fulness  of 

liberty  consists  in  the  great  use  of  our  positive  ability  to  follow 
the  worse,  while  we  truly  know  the  better.” — Ibid.  p.  138. 


OF  GALL. 


OF  THE  FACULTIES. 


Gall’s  philosophy  consists  wholly  in  the 
substitution  of  multiplicity  for  unity .  In 
place  of  one  general  and  single  brain,*  he 
substitutes  a  number  of  small  brains  :  instead 
of  one  general  sole  understanding,  he  sub¬ 
stitutes  several  individual  understandings.! 


*  The  question  here  relates  solely  to  the  brain,  properly  so 
called,  (the  lobes  or  cerebral  hemispheres.)  The  rest  of  the 
encephalon  does  not  serve  in  the  operations  of  the  understand¬ 
ing.  See  the  preceding  article,  p.  29,  et  seq. 

f  Individual  intelligences — an  expression  of  Gall's.  “  Each 
individual  intelligence  has  its  own  proper  organ.” — iv.  341. 


48 


These  pretended  individual  understandings 
are  the  faculties . 

Now,  Gall  admits  the  existence  of  twenty- 
seven  of  these  faculties,  each  one  of  them 
(since  each  one  is  a  peculiar  understanding) 
endowed  with  its  perceptive  faculty,  its  me¬ 
mory,  its  judgment,  its  imagination  ;  &c.* 

Hence,  there  are  twenty-seven  perceptive 
faculties,  twenty-seven  memories,  twenty-seven 
judgments,  twenty-seven  imaginations,  &c. 

For,  if  we  are  to  follow  Gall,  each  attribute 
is  not  less  distinct  than  each  faculty.  The 
memory,  the  judgment,  imagination,  &c.  of 
one  faculty  are  not  the  memory,  judgment, 
or  imagination  of  another  faculty. 


*  Even  the  instincts,  according  to  Gall,  have  their  memory, 
imagination,  &c.  “  The  instinct  of  propagation,  that  of  the 

love  of  offspring,  pride,  vanity,  possess,  beyond  contradiction, 
their  perceptive  faculty,  their  recollection,  their  memory,  judg¬ 
ment,  imagination,  and  their  own  attention.” — T.  iv.  p.  331. 
“  The  propensities  and  the  sentiments  likewise  possess  their 
judgment,  their  taste,  their  imagination,  their  recollection,  and 
their  memory.” — iv.  344. 


49 

“The  sense  of  numbers,”  says  he,  “pos¬ 
sesses  a  judgment  for  the  relations  of  num¬ 
bers  ;  the  sense  of  the  arts,  a  judgment  for 
works  of  art ;  but  where  the  fundamental 
faculty  is  wanting,  the  judgment  relative  to 
objects  of  that  faculty  must  necessarily  be 
wanting  likewise.”* 

He  says  further :  “  It  is  impossible  for  an 
individual  to  possess  imagination  and  judgment 
for  any  object  with  the  fundamental  faculty 
for  which  he  has  not  been  gifted  by  nature.”t 

Thus,  beyond  all  doubt :  there  are  twenty- 
seven  faculties;  and  as  there  are  twenty-seven 
faculties,  there  must  be  twenty-seven  memories, 
judgments,  imaginations,  &c. 

In  one  word,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a 
general  understanding;  but  there  are  twenty- 
seven  special  understandings,  with  three  or 
four  times  twenty-seven  distinct  attributes 

*  Gall,  t.  iv.  p.  325.  f  Ibid. 

4 


50 


of  each.  Such  is  the  entire  psycology  of 
Gall. 

To  proceed.  Gall’s  twenty-seven  faculties 
are  :  the  instinct  of  propagation,  love  of  off¬ 
spring,  self-defence,  the  carnivorous  instinct, 
the  sense  of  property,  friendship,  cunning, 
pride,  vanity,  circumspection,  memory  for 
things,  memory  for  words,  sense  of  locality, 
sense  of  persons,  sense  of  language,  of  rela¬ 
tions  of  colours,  relations  of  sounds,  relations 
of  numbers,  of  mechanics,  of  comparative 
sagacity,  the  metaphysical  genius,  sarcasm, 
poetic  talent,  benevolence,  imitation,  religion, 
firmness. 

Gall  says  that  these  faculties  are  innate/* 
and  this  assertion  certainly  will  not  be  con¬ 
tested. 

Locke,  who  so  vigorously  opposed  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  innate  ideas,  never  decried  the  innate - 


*  See  particularly  t.  ii.  p.  5. 


51 


ness  of  our  faculties.  He  always  regarded 
them  as  natural,  that  is  to  say,  innate* 

Condillac  himself,  who  charges  Locke  with 
having  considered  the  faculties  of  the  soul  as 
innate ,  in  making  these  charges  confounds  the 
faculties  of  the  soul  with  the  operations  of 
the  soul. t 

Now,  that  which  is  perfectly  true  as  to  the 
operations  of  the  soul ,  is  by  no  means  so  as 

regards  her  faculties.  All  the  faculties  of  the 

% 

soul  are  innate  and  contemporary,  for  they  are 
nothing  more  than  modes  of  the  soul ;  indeed, 


*  “  Had  I  to  do  with  readers  wholly  free  from  prejudice,  I 
should,  in  order  to  convince  them  of  this,  (the  supposition  of 
innate  ideas,)  have  nothing  to  do  but  show  them  that  mankind 
acquire  all  the  knowledge  they  possess  by  the  simple  use  of 
their  natural  faculties.” — Philos.  Essay  on  the  Human  Under¬ 
standing. 

f  “  Locke  contents  himself,”  says  he,  “  with  acknowledging 
that  the  soul  perceives,  doubts,  believes,  reasons,  knows,  wills, 
and  reflects:  that  we  are  convinced  of  the  existence  of  these 
operations;  ....  but  he  seems  to  have  regarded  them  as  some¬ 
thing  innate.”  A  short  time  before  he  had  said,  “We  shall 
see  that  all  the  faculties  of  the  soul  appeared  to  him  to  be 
innate  qualities.” — Traite  des  Sensations.  (Extrait  raisonn£.) 


52 


they  are  the  soul  itself,  viewed  under  different 
aspects.  But  the  operations  of  the  soul  suc¬ 
ceed  each  other,  and  beget  each  other.  There 
can  be  no  memory  without  previous  percep¬ 
tion  ;  there  can  be  no  judgment  without  recol¬ 
lection.  In  order  that  there  may  be  a  will, 
there  must  have  been  a  judgment,  &c. 

After  saying  that  the  faculties  are  innate, 
Gall  says  also  that  they  are  independent .* 

And  if,  by  the  word  independent ,  he  means 
distinct,  there  is  nothing  less  contestible.  But 
if,  by  this  word  independent ,  he  understood 
(as  indeed  he  does  understand)  that  each 
faculty  is  a  real  understanding,  the  question 
is  altered  and  the  difficulty  begins. 

For,  if  each  individual  faculty  is  a  proper 
understanding,  it  follows  that  there  are  as 
many  understandings  as  there  are  faculties, 
and  the  understanding  ceases  to  be  one ,  and 


*  See  t.  iii.  p.  81. 


53 


the  me  is  no  longer  one.  I  am  well  aware 

i 

that  this  is  exactly  what  Gall  means ;  he  says 
it,  and  reiterates  it  throughout  his  work.  He 
says  it,  but  does  not  prove  it.  And  how 
should  he  prove  it  ?  Can  we  prove  any  thing 
against  our  consciousness  ? 

“  I  remark  here,  in  the  first  place,”  says 
Descartes,  “  that  there  is  a  great  difference 
between  the  mind  and  the  body,  in  that  the 
body  is,  by  its  nature,  always  divisible,  and 
the  mind  wholly  indivisible.  For,  in  fact, 
when  I  contemplate  it — that  is,  when  I  contem¬ 
plate  my  own  self — and  consider  myself  as  a 
thing  that  thinks,  I  cannot  discover  in  myself 
any  parts,  but  I  clearly  know  and  conceive  that 
I  am  a  thing  absolutely  one  and  complete.”* 

Gall  reverses  the  common  philosophy,  and 
it  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  the  whole  of  his 
philosophy,  which  he  thinks  so  novel,!  is,  to 

*  T.  i.  p.  343. 

f  “  I  may  now  flatter  myself,”  says  he,  “  that  the  reader  is 


54 


the  very  letter,  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
this  very  inversion.  According  to  common 
philosophy,  there  is  one  general  understand¬ 
ing — a  unit ;  and  there  are  faculties  which  are 
but  modes  of  this  understanding.  Gall  asserts 
that  there  are  as  many  kinds  of  peculiar  intel¬ 
ligences  as  there  are  faculties,  and  that  the 
understanding  in  general  is  nothing  more  than 
a  mode  or  attribute  of  each  faculty.  He  says 
so  expressly. 

His  words  are  :  “  The  intellectual  faculty  and 
all  its  subdivisions,  such  as  perception,  recollec¬ 
tion,  memory,  judgment,  and  imagination,  are 
not  fundamental  faculties,  but  merely  their 
general  attributes.”* 

Gall  first  inverts  the  common  philosophy, 
and  then  contends  for  the  existence  of  all  the 
consequences  of  that  common  philosophy. 


sufficiently  prepared  for  quite  a  new  philosophy,  deduced 
directly  from  the  fundamental  forces.” — T.  iii.  p.  11. 

*  T.  iv.  p.  327. 


55 


He  suppresses  the  me ,  but  insists  that  there 
is  a  soul.  He  abolishes  the  freewill,  and  yet 
contends  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  morals. 
He  makes  of  the  idea  of  God  an  idea  that  is 
merely  relative  and  conditional,  but  yet  asserts 
that  there  may  be  such  a  thing  as  religion. 

I  say  he  abolishes  the  me;  for  the  me  is  the 
soul.  The  soul  is  the  understanding,  general 
and  one  ;  but  if  there  be  no  understanding  as 
general,  there  can  be  no  soul. 

According  to  Gall,  there  is  nothing  real  and 
positive  except  the  faculties . 

And  these  faculties  alone  are  possessed  of 
organs.  “  None  of  my  predecessors,”  says  he, 
“had  any  knowledge  of  those  forces  which 
alone  are  the  functions  of  special  cerebral 
organs.”* 

By  the  contrary  reasoning,  neither  the  will, 
nor  the  reason,  nor  the  understanding,  are 


*  T.  iv.  p.  319. 


56 


possessed  of  any  organs,  for  they  are  nothing 
but  forces  ;  they  are  nothing  but  nouns  collec¬ 
tive — words. 

“  These  observations  may  suffice,”  says  Gall, 
“  to  convince  the  reader  that  there  cannot  exist 
any  special  organ  of  the  will,  or  the  freewill.”* 
He  adds :  “  It  is  equally  impossible  that  there 
should  be  any  peculiar  organ  of  the  reason. ”t 

Finally  he  says  :  “  From  all  that  I  have  now 
said  it  follows,  that  the  idea  of  an  organ  of 
the  intellect  or  understanding  is  quite  as  inad¬ 
missible  as  the  idea  of  an  organ  of  the 
instinct.”;}: 

Hence  there  can  be  nought  but  the  faculties ; 
and,  according  to  Gall,  these  faculties  are  so 
distinct,  that  he  attributes  to  each  particular 
one  a  separate  organ. §  He  divides  the  under¬ 
standing  into  little  understandings. 

*  T.  iv.  p.  341.  j-  Ibid.  $  Ibid. 

§  “  Each  individual  understanding  possesses  its  own  proper 
organ.” — T.  iv.  p.  341. 


57 


Descartes  expressed  himself  in  the  following 
words:  “We  do  not  conceive  of  any  body, 
except  as  divisible ;  whereas  the  human  mind 
cannot  conceive  of  itself  except  as  indivisible ; 
for  in  fact  we  are  incapable  of  conceiving  of 
half  a  soul.”*  Gall,  however,  settles  that 
point.  He  makes  half  souls.  He  retrenches 
or  adds  as  many  faculties  as  suits  his  plan. 
These  faculties  are  separated  by  material 
limits.  He  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  such 
or  such  a  faculty  acts  with  greater  or  less 
facility  upon  such  or  such  another  faculty, 
according  as  one  happens  to  be  situated  nearer 
to  or  farther  off  from  the  other. 

“As  the  organ  of  the  arts,”  says  he,  “is 
located  far  from  that  of  the  sense  of  colour, 
the  circumstance  explains  why  historical 
painters  have  rarely  been  colourists.”t 

Thus,  we  find  that  the  faculties  alone  are 


*  T.  i.  p.  230. 


f  T.  iv.  p.  105. 


58 


possessed  of  forces .  These  forces  alone  are 
endowed  with  organs;  and  these  organs,  by 
which  they  are  kept  separate  from  each  other, 
separate  them  to  distances  sufficiently  great  to 
hinder,  in  certain  cases,  one  given  faculty  from 
exercising  any  influence  over  another.  There¬ 
fore,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  unity ;  there  is 
no  unit  faculty,  no  unit  understanding ;  there 
is  no  me;  and  if  there  be  no  me ,  there  can  be 
no  soul. 

In  the  same  way  he  abolishes  the  free¬ 
will.  Will,  liberty,  reason,  in  his  view,* 
are  nothing  but  results ,  as  I  have  already 
stated. 

“  To  the  end,”  says  he,  “  that  man  may  not 
be  confined  merely  to  the  ability  to  wish — in 
order  that  he  may  actually  will — the  concur¬ 
rence  of  several  superior  faculties  is  requisite. 
The  motives  must  be  weighed,  compared,  and 


*  See  the  preceding  articles. 


59 


judged ;  the  decision  resulting  from  this  opera¬ 
tion  is  denominated  will.”* 

“  Reason,”  he  further  adds,  “  supposes  a 
concerted  action  of  the  superior  faculties.  It 
is  the  judgment  pronounced  by  the  superior 
intellectual  faculties.”! 

Hence,  the  will  is  nothing  hut  a  decision; 
reason  is  nothing  but  a  judgment .  The  facul¬ 
ties  concert  together .  What  a  singular  phi¬ 
losophy,  which  always  substitutes  the  fictions 
of  language  for  the  facts  of  the  conscious  sense, 
and  which  is  satisfied  with  those  fictions ! 

Freewill  is  either  a  power,  a  force,  or  it  is 
nothing.  He  resolves  that  it  is  merely  a  result. 
Gall  therefore  abolishes  the  freewill. 

Indeed,  he  makes  of  the  idea  of  God  nothing 
but  a  relative  and  conditional  idea,  for  he  sup- 

*  T.  iv.  p.  340.  “  From  all  these  faculties  comes  at  last 

decision.  It  is  this  decision  .  .  .  which  is  really  will  and  wish¬ 
ing.” — T.  ii.  p.  105. 
f  T.  iv.  p.  341. 


60 


poses  that  this  idea  comes  from  a  particular 
organ ;  and  he  supposes  that  that  organ  may 
possibly,  in  some  case,  be  wanting. 

“  It  cannot  be  doubted/5  says  Gall,  “  that 
the  human  race  are  endowed  with  an  organ 
by  means  of  which  it  recognises  and  admires 
the  Author  of  the  universe.”* 

“  God  exists/5  adds  he,  “for  there  is  an 
organ  to  know  and*  adore  him.55t 

But  he  continues:  “Climate  and  other  cir¬ 
cumstances  may  obstruct  the  development  of 
the  cerebral  part,  by  means  of  which  the 
Creator  designed  to  reveal  himself  to  his  crea¬ 
ture  man.55f 

Again :  “  If  there  were  a  people  whose 
organization  should  be  altogether  defective  in 
this  respect,  they  would  be  as  little  susceptible 
as  any  other  kinds  of  animal,  of  the  religious 
idea  or  sentiment.55§ 

*  T.  iv.  p.  269.  -f  T.  iv.  p.  271. 

$  T.  iv.  p.  252.  §  T.  iv.  p.  252. 


61 


Farther :  “  There  is  no  God  for  beines  whose 

0 

organization  does  not  bear  the  original  stamp 
of  determinate  faculties.”* 

What !  If  I  happen  not  to  possess  a  little 
peculiar  organ,  (for  it  may  be  wanting,)  can  I 
not  feel  that  God  exists !  And  how  can  I  be 
an  intelligence,  knowing  myself,  and  yet  not 
knowing  that  God  is?  I  do  not  more  strongly 
feel  that  I  am,  than  that  God  is.  “  This  idea,” 
(the  idea  of  God)  says  Descartes,  “  is  born  and 

produced  along  with  me,  just  as  is  the  idea  of 

«. 

myself.”t 

My  understanding,  which  perceives  itself 
and  feels  itself  to  be  an  effect;  necessarily  per* 
ceives  the  intelligent  Cause  which  produced 
it.  “  It  is  a  very  evident  thing,”  says  Des¬ 
cartes  again,  “that  there  must  be  at  least  as 
much  reality  in  a  cause  as  in  the  effect  it 
produces ;  and  since  I  am  a  thing  that  thinks, 


*  T.  iv.  p.  10. 


t  T.  i.  p.  290. 


62 


whatsoever  be  in  fact  the  cause  of  my  being, 
I  am  compelled  to  confess,  that  it  also  is 
something  that  thinks.”* 

Hitherto  I  have  considered  GalPs  philosophy 
only  under  its  speculative  points  of  view  ; 
what  would  it  be,  if  considered  in  a  practical 
relation  ? 

In  one  of  his  happy  moments,  Diderot  wrote 
the  following  very  remarkable  phrase :  “  The 
ruin  of  liberty  overthrows  all  order  and  all 
government,  confounds  vice  and  virtue  to¬ 
gether,  sanctions  every  monstrous  infamy, 
extinguishes  all  shame  and  all  remorse,  and 
degrades  and  deforms  without  recovery  the 
whole  human  race.”t 

Nothing  astonishes  a  phrenologist. 

“  Let  us  imagine,”  says  Gall,  “  a  woman  in 
whom  the  love  of  offspring  is  but  little  deve¬ 
loped,  .  .  if,  unfortunately,  the  organ  of  murder 

*  T.  i.  p.  287. 

f  Article  “  Liberte,”  Diction.  Encyclop. 


63 


be  very  much  developed  in  her,  need  we  be 
surprised  if  her  hand . ”*  &c. 

Organization  explains  every  thing. 

“  These  last  named  facts  show  us,”  says 
Gall,  “that  this  detestable  inclination  (the 
inclination  to  commit  murder)  has  its  source 
in  a  vice  of  the  organization.”! 

“Let  those  haughty  men,”  says  he  again, 
“  who  cause  nations  to  be  slaughtered  by  thou¬ 
sands,  know  that  they  do  not  act  of  their  own 
accord,  but  that  Nature  herself  has  filled  their 
hearts  with  rage  and  destructiveness. 

No,  indeed  !  This  is  not  what  they  must 
know ;  for,  thanks  be  to  God,  it  is  not  true. 
What  they  ought  to  know,  what  they  ought 
to  be  told,  is,  that  although  Providence  has 
left  to  man  the  power  to  do  evil,  he  has  also 
endowed  him  with  the  power  to  do  good. 
That  which  man  ought  to  know,  that  which 

*  T.  iii.  p.  155.  Such  phrases  cannot  be  concluded, 
t  T.  iii.  p.  213.  *  Ibid.  219. 


64 


should  be  instilled  into  his  mind  and  heart  is, 
that  he  has  a  free  power,  and  that  this  power 
ought  not  to  be  misdirected ;  and  that  he  who 
in  his  own  nature  misdirects  it,  no  matter 
under  what  form  of  philosophy  he  takes  re¬ 
fuge,  is  a  being  who  degrades  his  nature. 

Under  the  title  of  fundamental  faculties , 
Gall  confounds  all  things  together — the  pas¬ 
sions,  the  instinct,  the  intellectual  faculties. 
These  faculties,  which  are  at  the  basis  of  his 
whole  philosophy,  he  knows  not  even  how  to 
denominate  them.  He  calls  them  instincts,* 
inclinations,  senses,  memories,  &c.  There  is 
a  memory  or  sense  of  things,  a  memory  or 
sense  of  persons,  &c.  He  confounds  the  in¬ 
stinct  that  leads  certain  animals  to  live  in 


*  “  This  term,  instinct,  is  applicable,”  says  he,  “  to  all  the 
fundamental  forces.” — T.  iv.  p.  334.  And  he  does  not  see 
that  as  to  the  instincts  and  the  understanding  all  is  contrast. 
Upon  this  difference  of  instinct  and  understanding,  see  my 
work  De  l’Instinct  et  de  Tlntelligence  des  Animaux,  etc. 
Paris,  1845,  2d  edit. 


65 


elevated  regions  with  pride,  which  is  a  moral 
sentiment  in  man  the  carnivorous  instinct 
with  courage  ;t  he  believes  that  conscience, 
(which  is  the  soul  judging  itself,)  is  nothing 
but  a  modification  of  a  particular  sense,  the 
sense  of  benevolence,  &c.J 

The  hesitation  of  his  mind  is  visible  every 
where. 

*  It  is  true  that  this  approximation  astonishes  him.  “  The 
predilection  of  animals  for  elevated  places  depends,”  says  he, 
“  upon  the  same  parts  as  pride,  which  is  in  man  a  moral  senti¬ 
ment  !  Let  the  reader  imagine  the  astonishment  excited  in  my 
mind  by  such  a  phenomenon.” — T.  iii.  311. 

j-  “  Co-existing  with  the  love  of  war,  it  (the  carnivorous 
instinct)  constitutes  the  intrepid  warrior.” — T.  iii.  p.  258.  “  I 

know  a  head  which,  as  to  the  organ  of  murder,  approaches  that 
of  Madeline  Albert,  and  the  la  Bouhours,  except  only  that 
nature  has  executed  it  upon  a  grander  scale.  To  witness 
suffering,  is  for  this  person  to  have  the  keenest  enjoyment. 
Whoever  does  not  love  blood,  is  in  his  eyes  contemptible.,, — 
T.  iii.  p.  259.  The  pen  refuses  to  transcribe  such  things, 
which  fortunately,  however,  are  pure  extravagances. 

t  “  F rom  my  reflections  it  follows  that  conscience  is  nothing 
but  a  modification,  an  affection  of  the  moral  sense,”  (organ.) — 
T.  iv.  p.  210.  “  From  all  that  I  have  said  as  to  conscience,  it 

follows  that  it  can  by  no  means  be  regarded  as  a  fundamental 
quality  :  that  it  is  really  only  an  affection  of  the  moral  sense  — 
or  benevolence.” — T.  iv.  p.  217. 

5 


66 


“  I  leave  it  to  the  reader/’  says  he,  “  to 
decide  whether  the  fundamental  faculty  to 
which  this  penchant  relates,  should  be  deno¬ 
minated  sense  of  elevation,  self-esteem/’  &c.* 

66  To  speak  correctly,”  continues  he,  “  firm¬ 
ness  is  neither  a  penchant  nor  a  faculty ;  it  is 
a  mode-of-being,  which  gives  to  a  man  a  dis¬ 
tinctive  quality,  which  is  called  character.”! 

Finally,  he  writes  the  following  paragraph, 
perhaps  the  most  singular  one  that  he  ever 
wrote,  for  it  shows  in  the  clearest  manner 
how  little  confidence  he  had  in  his  own 
psycology. 

“  If  we  are  materialists  because  we  do  not 
admit  the  existence  of  a  unit-faculty  of  the 
soul,  but  recognise  several  primitive  faculties, 
we  ask  whether  the  ordinary  division  of  the 
faculties  of  the  soul  into  understanding,  will, 
attention,  memory,  judgment,  imagination,  and 


*  T.  iii.  p.  321. 


t  T.  iv.  p.  272. 


67 


affections  and  passions,  expresses  nothing  more 
than  a  primitive  unit-faculty  ?  If  it  be  asserted 
that  all  these  faculties  are  merely  modifications 
of  a  sole  and  same  faculty,  what  can  hinder 
us  from  making  the  same  assertion  as  to  the 
faculties  whose  existence  we  do  admit.”* 

To  be  sure,  nothing  prevents  you.  Or 
rather  every  thing  constrains  you  to  do  so. 
There  is  therefore  one  sole  faculty,  of  which 
all  the  other  faculties  are  but  moods.  You 
return  then  to  the  common  philosophy,  and 
consequently  you  no  longer  possess  a  peculiar 
philosophy. 

The  problem  proposed  by  Gall  is  at  the 
same  time  physiological,  psycological,  and 
anatomical. 

In  our  first  article  an  account  has  been 
given  of  Gall’s  physiology ,  and  it  has  been 
shown  to  be  generally  disproved  by  direct 


*  T.  ii.  p.  287. 


68 


experiment.  In  the  present  one  his  psycology 
has  been  examined,  and  it  is  confuted  by  the 
consciousness  ( le  sens  intime ).  It  only  re¬ 
mains  for  us  now  to  examine  his  anatomy . 


% 


OF  GALL. 


THE  ORGANS. 


Of  all  Gall’s  writings,  his  anatomy  is  that 
which  has  been  most  talked  of,  and  yet  it  is 
the  part  least  known. 

In  the  year  1808,  Gall  read  to  the  first  class 
of  the  Institute  a  memoir  on  the  anatomy  of 
the  brain  ;*  and  M.  Cuvier  made  a  report  upon 
that  memoir.  But  neither  in  that  memoir  nor 


*  Recherches  sur  le  systeme  nerveux  en  general  et  sur  celui 
du  cerveau  en  particulier;  memoire  presente  a  l’lnstitut  de 
France,  le  14  Mars,  1808;  suivi  d’Observations  sur  le  rapport 
qui  en  a  ete  fait  a  cette  compagnie  par  ses  commissaires,  par 
F.  J.  Gall  et  G.  Spurzheim.  Paris,  1809. 


70 


in  the  report  do  we  find  one  word  of  special 
anatomy ,  of  secret  anatomy ,  of  what  might 
be  called  anatomy  of  the  Doctrine ;  or,  in 
other  terms,  and  as  it  would  be  expressed  at 
the  present  day,  of  phrenological  anatomy . 

The  anatomy  of  Gall’s  memoir  is  nothing 
but  a  very  ordinary  anatomy.  He  insists  that 
the  cerebral  nerves,  all  of  them  without  excep¬ 
tion,  rise  upwards  from  the  medulla  oblongata 
towards  the  encephalon ;  that  the  cineritious 
matter  produces  the  white  matter :  he  divides 
the  fibres  of  the  brain  into  divergent  and  con¬ 
vergent;  he  supposes  that  each  convolution  of 
this  organ,  instead  of  being  a  full  and  solid 
mass,  as  is  generally  thought,  is  merely  a  fold* 
of  nervous  or  medullary  fibres,  &c.  &c. 

Such  are  the  questions  discussed  by  Gall ; 
and  it  is  sufficiently  clear  that,  whatever  side 


*  “  The  nervous  membrane  of  the  brain  forms  these  folds, 
which  are  denominated  its  convolutions.” — Anat.  et  Physiol, 
du  Systeme  Nerveux,  t.  iii.  p.  82. 


71 


we  take  upon  these  questions,  his  doctrine 
assuredly  would  neither  gain  nor  lose  any 
thing. 

Whether  such  or  such  a  nerve  ascends  or 
descends ;  whether  the  white  matter  is  pro¬ 
duced  by  the  gray;  or  whether,  which  is,  to 
say  the  least,  quite  as  probable,  this  be  non¬ 
sense  ;  whether  this  or  that  fibre  goes  out  or 
comes  in,  diverges  or  converges,  &c.  &c.  the 
doctrine  of  the  plurality  of  brains,  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  individual  intelligences,  will  be  neither 
more  nor  less  true,  more  nor  less  doubtful.* 

M.  Cuvier,  in  his  report,  observed :  “  It  is 
essential  to  repeat,  were  it  merely  for  the 
information  of  the  public,  that  the  anatomical 


*  Spurzheim  justly  remarks:  “Admitting  that  the  direction 
of  the  fibres  is  known,  that  we  know  their  consistence  to  be 
greater  or  less,  that  their  colour  is  more  or  less  white,  that  their 
magnitude  is  more  or  less  considerable,  &c.  what  conclusions 
can  we,  from  all  these  circumstances,  draw  as  to  their  func¬ 
tions]  None  at  all.” — Obser.  sur  la  Phrenologie,  ou  la  con- 
naissance  de  l’homme  moral  et  intellectuel  fondee  sur  les 
fonctions  du  Systeme  Nerveux,  p.  83.  Paris,  1818. 


72 


questions  we  have  been  considering,  have  no 

t 

immediate  and  necessary  connexion  with  the 
physiological  doctrines  taught  by  M.  Gall,  as 
to  the  functions  and  relative  volume  of  dif¬ 
ferent  parts  of  the  brain ;  and  that  all  that  we 
have  inquired  into  as  to  the  structure  of  the 
brain,  might  be  either  true  or  false,  without 
affording  the  least  conclusion  in  favour  of  or 
against  the  doctrine.”* 

It  is  necessary  not  to  make  any  mistake 
as  to  the  real  point  of  the  question.  Gaiks 
doctrine  goes  to  establish  one  and  only  one 
thing,  to  wit,  the  plurality  of  intelligences 
and  the  plurality  of  brains. t  That  is  what 
constitutes  the  special  and  peculiar  doctrine ; 


*  Rapport  sur  un  Memoire  de  MM.  Gall  et  Spurzheim,  re- 
latif  a  l’anat.  du  cerveau.  Seances  des  25  Avril  et  2  Mai,  1808. 

•j-  “  The  determination  of  the  fundamental  forces  and  the 
seat  of  their  organs  constitutes  the  most  striking  portion  of  my 
discoveries.  The  knowledge  of  the  primary  faculties  and 
qualities,  and  the  seat  of  their  material  conditions,  constitutes 
precisely  the  phrenology  of  the  brain.” — Gall,  Anat.  et  Phys. 
du  Syst.  Nerv.,  t.  iii.  p.  4. 


73 


that  is  to  say,  different  from  the  common  doc¬ 
trine,  which  admits  but  one  understanding  and 
a  single  brain.  Whatever  goes  to  prove  the 
plurality  of  understandings  and  brains  belongs 
to  Gall’s  doctrine ;  and  whatever  does  not  tend 
to  prove  the  plurality  of  understandings  and 
brains  is  in  opposition  to  that  doctrine. 

Gall’s  works  then  really  contain  two  very 
distinct  anatomies:  one  is  a  general  anatomy , 
which  has  nothing  in  particular  to  do  with 
his  doctrine  ;  the  other  is  a  special  anatomy , 
which,  supposing  it  to  be  true,  would  consti¬ 
tute  the  basis  of  his  doctrine. 

Now,  a  great  deal  has  been  said  about 
Gall’s  general  anatomy;  but  as  to  his  special 
anatomy,  I  know  of  no  one  who  has  spoken 
of  it.  Gall  himself  says  as  little  as  possible 
about  it.  In  other  matters  he  tells  his  opinions 
both  very  clearly  and  very  positively :  in  this 
particular  we  are  obliged  to  guess  at  them. 

When  Gall,  in  his  psycology ,  substitutes  the 


74 


faculties  for  the  understanding,  he  defines 
those  faculties .  He  defines  them,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  to  be  individual  intelli¬ 
gences.  How  happens  it,  then,  that  in  his 
anatomy,  when  he  substitutes  the  organs  of 
the  brain  for  the  brain  itself,  he  does  not 
define  these  organs  ?  How  strange !  Gall’s 
whole  doctrine,  all  phrenology ,  rests  upon  the 
organs  of  the  brain ;  for,  without  distinct 
cerebral  organs,  there  can  be  no  independent 
faculties ;  and  without  independent  faculties 
there  can  be  no  phrenology :  and  Gall  does 
not  say,  nor  has  any  phrenologist  said  for 
him,  what  is  the  thing  called  a  cerebral 
organ. 

The  truth  is :  Gall  never  had  any  settled 
opinion  upon  what  he  called  the  organs  of  the 
brain ;  he  never  saw  those  organs ,  and  he 
imagined  them  for  the  use  of  his  faculties. 
He  did  what  so  many  others  have  done.  He 
commenced  with  imagining  a  hypothesis,  and 


75 


then  he  imagined  an  anatomy  to  suit  his 
hypothesis. 

When  the  doctrine  of  animal  spirits  was 
believed,  the  brain  was  composed  of  pipes 
and  tubes  to  convey  these  spirits. 

“  The  cortical  substance  which  is  found  in 
the  hemispheres  of  the  brain,”  says  Pourfour 
du  Petit,  “furnishes  the  whole  of  the  medul¬ 
lary  portion,  which  is  a  mere  collection  of  an 
infinite  number  of  pipes.”* 

“  The  small  arteries  of  the  cortical  part  of 
the  brain,”  says  Haller,  “  transmit  a  spirituous 
liquor  into  the  medullary  and  nervous  tubes.”t 
It  is  evident  that  the  organs  of  Gall  have 
no  more  real  existence  than  the  pipes  of  Pour- 
four  du  Petit,  or  the  tubes  of  Haller.  They 
are  two  structures  that  have  been  imagined, 
as  suitable  for  two  hypotheses. 

In  searching  for  the  primary  idea,  the  secret 

*  Lettre  d’un  Medecin  des  HSpitaux  du  Roi.  Namur.  1710. 
t  Elementa  Physiologise,  t.  iv.  p.  384. 


76 


notion  that  led  Gall  to  his  doctrine  of  the 
plurality  of  the  intelligences ,  I  detect  it  in 
the  analogy  that  he  supposed  to  exist  between 
the  functions  of  the  senses  and  the  faculties  of 
the  soul. 

He  sees  the  functions  of  the  senses  con¬ 
stituting  distinct  functions,  and  insists  that  the 
faculties  of  the  soul  must  constitute  equally 
distinct  faculties  ;  he  sees  each  particular  sense 
possessing  an  organ  proper  to  itself,  and  thinks 
that  each  faculty  of  the  soul  must  have  its 
proper  organ  ;*  in  one  word,  he  looks  upon 
the  outer  man,  and  constructs  the  inner  man 
after  the  image  of  the  outer  man. 

According  to  Gall,  every  thing  between  an 
organ  of  a  sense  and  an  organ  of  a  faculty, 
between  a  faculty  and  sense,  is  similar.  A 


*  “  But  if  it  be  supposed  that  each  fundamental  faculty,  as 
well  as  each  particular  sense,  is  dependent  on  a  particular  part 
of  the  brain,”  &c.  Gall,  Anat.  et  Phys.  du  Syst.  Nerv.,  t.  iii. 
p.  392. 


t 


77 

faculty  is  a  sense.  His  words  are:  the  memory 
or  the  sense  of  things ,  the  memory  or  the 
sense  of  persons ,  the  memory  or  the  sense 
of  numbers .  He  talks  of  the  sense  of  lan¬ 
guage ,  the  sense  of  mechanics ,  the  sense  of 
the  relations  of  colours ,  &c.  &c. 

“  As  we  must  admit,”*  says  he,  “  five  dif¬ 
ferent  external  senses,  since  their  functions 

are  essentially  different, . so  we  must 

agree,  after  all,  to  acknowledge  the  different 
faculties  and  the  different  inclinations  as  being 
essentially  different  moral  and  intellectual 
forces,  and  likewise  connected  with  organic 
apparatuses,  which  are  special  to  each  and 
independent  of  each  other.”* 

“Who,”  says  he,  “can  dare  to  say  that 
sight,  hearing,  taste,  smell,  and  touch,  are 
simple  modifications  of  faculties  ?  Who  could 
dare  to  derive  them  from  a  single  and  same 


*  T.  iv.  p.  9. 


78 


source,  from  a  single  and  same  organ  ?  In 
the  same  way,  the  twenty-seven  qualities  and 
faculties  which  I  recognise  as  fundamental  or 
primary  forces,  ....  cannot  be  regarded  as  the 
simple  modifications  of  any  one  faculty.”* 

On  the  one  hand,  Gall  gives  to  the  faculties 
all  the  independence  of  the  senses ;  and  on  the 
other,  he  gives  the  senses  all  the  attributes  of 
the  faculties . 

“  Here,”  says  he,  “  are  new  reasons  why 
I  have  always  maintained  in  my  public 
discourses,  though  these  assertions  are  in 
opposition  to  the  ideas  that  prevail  among 
philosophers,  that  each  organ  of  a  sense  pos¬ 
sesses  absolutely  its  own  functions ;  that  each 
of  these  organs  has  its  peculiar  faculty  of 
receiving  and  even  of  perceiving  impressions, 
its  own  conscience,  its  own  faculty  of  reminis¬ 
cence,”!  &c. 


*  T.  iv.  p.  9. 


|  T.  ii.  p.  234. 


79 


Gall  did  not  foresee  that  a  physiological 
experiment  (and  a  very  sure  one  it  is)  would 
one  day  demonstrate  that  the  sense  receives 
the  impression  but  does  not  perceive  it,  and 
that,  consequently,  it  is  endowed  neither  with 
conscience  nor  reminiscence ,  &c. 

When  the  cerebral  lobes  or  hemispheres* 
are  removed  from  an  animal,  the  animal  im¬ 
mediately  loses  its  sight. 

And  yet  nothing,  as  regards  the  eyes  them¬ 
selves,  has  been  changed ;  objects  continue  to 
be  depicted  upon  the  retina,  the  iris  retains  its 
contractility,  and  the  optic  nerve  its  excita¬ 
bility.  The  retina  continues  to  be  sensible  of 
light,  for  the  iris  contracts  or  dilates  according 
as  the  light  admitted  to  it  is  more  or  less 
intense. 

No  change  has  taken  place  as  to  the  struc¬ 
ture  of  the  eye,  and  yet  the  animal  does  not 


*  The  brain,  properly  so  called. 


80 


see  !  Therefore  it  is  not  the  eye  that  perceives, 
nor  is  it  the  eye  that  sees.* 

The  eye  does  not  see;  it  is  the  understand¬ 
ing  that  sees  by  means  of  the  eyes.t 

When  Gall  concludes  from  the  independence 
of  the  external  senses  to  the  independence  of 
the  faculties  of  the  soul,  he  confounds,  as  to 
the  sense  itself,  two  things  that  are  essentially 
distinct,  impression  and  perception.  Impres¬ 
sion  is  multiple  ;  perception  is  single. 

When  the  hemispheres  are  removed,  the 
animal  instantly  loses  its  perception ;  it  no 
longer  sees  nor  hears, f  &c.  notwithstanding 
all  the  organs  of  the  senses,  the  eye,  the  ear, 
&c.  subsist,  and  the  impressions  take  place. 

Therefore  the  principle  that  perceives  is  one . 
Lost  for  one  sense,  it  is  lost  for  all  the  senses. 


*  I  see  with  my  eyes. — M. 

j-  See  my  Recherches  Experimentales  sur  les  proprietes  et 
les  fonctions  da  Systeme  Nerveax,  2d  edit.  1842. 

*  Ibid. 


81 


And  if  it  be  one  for  the  external  senses,  how 
can  it  be  other  than  one  for  the  faculties  of 
the  soul  ? 

Gall  therefore  cannot  suppose  the  existence 
of  several  distinct  principles  for  the  faculties  of 
the  soul,  otherwise  than  because  he  supposes 
several  distinct  principles  for  the  perceptions ; 
and  he  only  supposes  several  principles  for  the 
perceptions  because  he  confounds  impression 
with  perception.  The  whole  of  his  psycology 
arises  from  a  mistake ;  and  the  whole  of  his 
anatomy  is  constructed  for  the  sake  of  his 
psycology. 

In  psycology  he  endeavours  to  prove  that 
the  faculties  of  the  soul  are  merely  internal 
senses;  in  anatomy,  he  endeavours  to  prove 
that  the  organs  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul 

i 

only  repeat  and  reproduce  the  organs  of  the 
external  senses . 

Now  an  organ ,  that  is  to  say,  under  the 

present  point  of  view,  the  nerve  of  an  external 

6 


82 


sense,  is  nothing  more  than  a  fascicle  of 

| 

nervous  fibres .  Therefore  the  brain,  under 
the  theory,  can  be  nothing  but  a  collection 
of  fascicles  of  fibres .* 

According  to  Gall,  the  origin,  the  develop¬ 
ment,  the  structure  and  mode  of  termination, 
as  to  the  organs  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul 
and  the  organs  of  the  external  senses,  every 
thing  is  similar,  every  thing  is  in  common. 
And  yet  the  primitive  difficulty  remains  un¬ 
solved. 

When  I  say  an  organ  of  the  senses ,  I  speak 
of  a  very  determinate  nervous  apparatus.  But 
is  the  same  thing  true  when  I  say  an  organ  of 
the  brain  ?  What  is  an  organ  of  the  brain  ? 
Is  it  a  fascicle  of  fibres?  Is  it  each  particular 
fibre  ?  But  if  it  be  a  fascicle  of  fibres ,  there 
are  too  few  of  them,  for  there  are  not  twenty- 
seven  of  them ;  and  twenty-seven  are  neces- 

*  See  at  the  end  of  this  work  the  first  Note  on  Gall’s 
Anatomy. 


83 


sary,  for  there  are  twenty-seven  faculties.  If 
it  be  each  particular  fibre,  then  there  are  too 
many  of  them,  and  far  too  many,  because 
there  are  only  twenty-seven  faculties.  What 
are  we  to  do  in  this  difficulty?  We  must  do 
as  Gall  does:  sometimes  say  it  is  a  fascicle 
of  fibres ;  at  other  times,  that  it  is  each  fibre 
in  particular. 

In  one  place  he  says :  “  The  brain  consisting 
of  several  divisions  whose  functions  are  totally 
different,  there  are  several  primary  bundles, 
which  contribute  by  their  development  to  pro¬ 
duce  it.  Among  these  bundles  we  place  the 
anterior  and  posterior  pyramids,  the  bundles 
that  come  off  direct  from  the  corpora  olivaria, 
and  some  others  that  are  concealed  in  the 
interior  of  the  medulla  oblongata.”* 

*  T.  i.  p.  271.  Spurzheim  explains  himself  in  like  manner. 
“  The  organs  of  the  internal  faculties  are  as  separate  as  the  bundles 
of  the  nerves  of  the  five  senses.” — Observ.  sur  la  Phrenol.,  &c. 
p.  74.  “  It  is  found  that  the  brain  is  composed  of  many  bundles, 
which  must  have  their  functions.” — Ibid.  p.  94.  “  The  organs 


84 


t find  there  are  yet  some  others ;  be  it  so  ; 
but  they  never  can  amount  to  twenty-seven. 

Again  he  says  :  “  A  more  extensive  develop¬ 
ment  of  the  same  conjecture,  might  perhaps 
dispose  the  reader  to  consider  each  nervous 
fibrilla,  whether  in  the  nerves  or  in  the  brain 
itself,  as  a  little  special  organ. ”* 

Even  this  is  not  all.  For  the  sake  of  Gall’s 
doctrine,  the  anatomy  of  the  brain  must  have 
a  connexion  with  cranioscopy.  And  Gall 
takes  great  care  to  place  all  his  organs  upon 
the  surface  of  the  brain. 

“  The  possibility  of  a  solution  of  the  pro¬ 
blem  under  consideration,”  says  he,  “  supposes 
the  organs  of  the  soul  to  be  situated  at  the 
surface  of  the  brain. ”t  Indeed,  were  they 
not  situated  at  the  surface  of  the  brain,  how 

.  .  .  .  are  composed  of  divergent  bundles,  of  convolutions,  and  of 
the  commissures.” — Ibid. 

*  T.  iv.  p.  8.  “  Bonnet  believes,  and  it  is  probable,  that  each 
nerve  fibre  has  its  own  proper  action.” — Ibid, 
j-  T.  iii.  p.  2. 


85 


could  the  cranium  bear  the  impression  of 
them  ?  and  what  would  become  of  cranios- 
copy  ? 

Cranioscopy  has  nothing  to  fear.  Gall  has 
made  provision  for  it ;  all  the  organs  of  the 
brain  are  placed  at  the  surface  of  the  brain ; 
and  Gall  most  judiciously  adds,  “  This  ex¬ 
plains  the  relation  or  the  correspondence  that 
exists  between  craniology  and  the  doctrine  of 
the  cerebral  functions  (cerebral  physiology), 
the  sole  aim  and  end  of  my  researches.”* 

But  as  to  the  pretended  organs  of  the  brain , 
are  they  really  situated  at  the  surface  of  the 
brain,  as  Gall  asserts  ?  In  plain  terms,  is  the 
surface  of  the  brain  the  only  active  part  of 
the  organ  ?  Here  is  a  physiological  experi¬ 
ment  that  shows  how  very  much  mistaken 
Gall  is. 

You  can  slice  off  a  considerable  portion  of 


*  T.  iii.  p.  4. 


86 


an  animal’s  brain,  either  in  front,  behind,  on 
one  side,  or  on  the  top,  without  his  losing  any 
one  of  his  faculties.* 

The  animal  may,  therefore,  lose  all  that  Gall 
calls  surface  of  the  brain,  without  losing  any 
of  his  faculties.  Therefore  it  cannot  be  that 
the  organs  of  the  faculties  reside  at  the  surface 
of  the  brain . 

And  comparative  anatomy  is  not  less  oppo¬ 
site  to  Gall’s  opinions  than  is  direct  experi¬ 
ment  itself.  I  shall  not  follow  him  here  in  the 
detail  of  his  localizations.  How  could  these 
localizations  have  any  meaning?  He  does 
not  even  know  whether  an  organ  is  a  fascicle 
of  fibres ,  or  a  fibre. t 

For  example ;  he  places  what  he  calls  the 


*  See  my  Recherches  Experimentales  sur  les  proprietes  et 
les  fonctions  du  Systeme  Nerveux,  2d  edit.  1842.  See  also  the 
first  article  of  this  work. 

f  It  must,  however,  be  one  or  the  other ;  for  it  must  be  some¬ 
thing.  Might  it  be  a  convolution,  as  has  been  since  said  !  But 
there  are  not  seven  and  twentv  convolutions, &c.  &c. 

r  # 


87 


instinct  of  propagation  in  the  cerebellum,  and 
what  he  calls  the  instinct  of  the  love  of 
offspring,  in  the  posterior  cerebral  lobes ;  and 
he  looks  upon  these  two  localizations  as  the 
very  surest  in  his  book. 

“I  should  wish, ”  says  he,  “that  all  young 
naturalists  might  begin  their  researches  with 
the  study  of  these  two  organs.  They  are  both 
easily  to  be  recognised,”*  &c. 

What !  The  cerebellum,  so  different  in  its 
structure  from  the  great  brain,  is  the  cere¬ 
bellum,  like  the  brain, t  to  be  considered  an 
organ  of  instinct  ?  And  what  is  more,  is  it  to 
be  regarded  as  the  organ  of  a  single  instinct 


*  T.  ii.  p.  163. 

j-  Gall,  as  we  have  seen,  confounds  understanding  with 
instinct.  Literally,  he  divides  understanding  into  many  in¬ 
stincts,  and  then  out  of  each  instinct  constructs  an  intellectual 
faculty.  See  the  second  article  of  this  work.  “The  term 
instinct  suits  all  the  fundamental  faculties.” — T.  iv.  p.  334. 
For  the  characters  peculiar  to  the  instincts,  see  my  work 
entitled  “  De  l’lnstinct  et  de  Intelligence  des  Animaux,”  2d 
edit.  1845. 


88 


only,  while  the  brain  shall  have  twenty-six  of 
them  ? 

I  have  already  said  that  the  cerebellum  is 
the  seat  of  the  principle  that  presides  over 
the  locomotion*  of  the  animal,  and  that  it  is 
not  the  seat  of  any  instinct. 

Gall  places  the  love  of  offspring  in  the  pos¬ 
terior  lobes  of  the  brain. t  Now,  the  love  of 
offspring,  and  especially  maternal  love,  is 
every  where  to  be  found  among  the  superior 
animals;  it  is  found  in  all  the  mammifera, 
in  all  the  birds.  J  The  posterior  lobes  of  the 
brain,  therefore,  ought  to  be  found  in  all  these 
beings.  Not  at  all:  the  posterior  lobes  are 
wanting  in  most  of  the  mammifera ;  they  are 
wanting  in  all  the  birds. 

Gall  locates  the  faculties  that  are  common  to 

*  See  my  Recherches  Experimentales  sur  les  proprietes  et 
les  fonctions  du  Systeme  Nervoux,  2d  edit.  1842. 

|  “  The  organ  of  philogeniture,  or  the  last  convolution  of  the 
cerebral  lobes.” — Spurzheim,  Obser.  sur  la  Phren.,  &c.  p.  117. 

$  With  very  few  exceptions. 


89 


both  man  and  animals,  in  the  posterior  part 
of  the  brain  ;  in  the  anterior  part  he  places 
those*  that  are  peculiar  to  man  alone.  Accord¬ 
ing  to  this  plan,  the  most  persistent  portion  of 
the  brain  will  be  the  posterior  portion,  and  the 
least  persistent  the  anterior  portion.  But  the 
inverse  of  the  proposition  holds.  The  parts 
that  are  most  frequently  wanting  are  the  pos¬ 
terior  parts,  and  those  that  are  most  invariably 
present  are  the  anterior  partsA 

If,  from  the  brain,  I  pass  on  to  consider  the 
cranium,  all  the  foregoing  is  found  to  be  of 


*  “  The  qualities  and  faculties  common  to  man  and  animals, 
are  situated  in  the  posterior  portions,”  &c. — T.  iii.  p.  79,  and 
t.  iv.  p.  13.  “The  qualities  and  faculties  that  man  exclusively 
enjoys,  are  situated  in  the  cerebral  portions,  of  which  the  brute 
creation  is  deprived ;  and  we  must  consequently  seek  for  them 
in  the  antero  superior  portion  of  the  frontal  bone.” — T.  iii. 
page  79. 

t  “  The  anterior  parts  of  the  brain  are  not  wanting  in  the 
mammifera,  but  the  posterior  parts,”  says  Leuret,  very  justly, 
in  his  fine  work  on  the  circumvolutions  of  the  brain,  entitled, 
Anat.  Compar.  du  Syst.  iN'erveux,  considere  dans  ses  rapports 
avec  l’lntelligence,  t.  i.  p.  588.  Paris,  1839. 


90 


still  greater  force.  How  can  the  localizations 
that  are  destitute  of  meaning  as  to  the  brain 
— how  can  they,  I  say,  have  any  meaning  as 
relative  to  the  cranium  itself? 

The  cranium,  especially  the  external  surface 
of  it,  represents  the  superficial  configuration 
of  the  brain  but  very  imperfectly.  Gall  knows 
it.  “  I  was  the  first,”  says  he,  “  to  maintain 
that  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  determine  with 
exactitude  the  development  of  certain  circum¬ 
volutions,  by  the  inspection  of  the  external 
surface  of  the  cranium.  In  certain  cases,  the 
exterior  lamina  of  the  cranium  is  not  parallel 
with  the  internal  lamina.”*  “  There  are  cer¬ 
tain  species  in  which  there  is  no  frontal 
sinus;  in  others,  the  cells  betwixt  the  two 
bony  laminae  are  found  throughout  the  whole 
skull, ”t  &c.  &c. 

The  cranium  represents  the  convolutions  of 


*  T.  iii.  p.  20. 


f  T.  iii.  p.  26. 


91 


the  brain  only  upon  its  inner  surface ;  it  does 
not  represent  them  upon  its  external  super¬ 
ficies.  And  as  to  the  fibres ,  as  to  the  bundles 
of  fibres ,  it  does  not  even  represent  them  on 
its  inner  surface  ;  for  the  fibres  are  covered 
with  a  layer  of  gray  matter,  and  the  bundles 
of  fibres  are  situated  in  the  interior  of  the 
nervous  mass. 

Gall  is  aware  of  all  this,  and  nevertheless 
he  inscribes  his  twenty-seven  faculties  upon 
the  skulls.*  Such  confidence  surprises  one. 
Nothing  is  known  of  the  intimate  structure  of 


*  It  is  curious  to  see  how  M.  Vimont,  a  very  decided  phreno¬ 
logist  as  well  as  an  able  anatomist,  expresses  himself  on  the 
subject  of  the  localizations  of  Gall  and  Spurzheim.  "  Gall’s 
work,”  says  M.  Vimont,  “  is  fitter  to  lead  into  error  than  to 
give  a  just  idea  of  the  seats  of  the  organs.” — Traite  de  Phren. 
t.  ii.  p.  12.  “  Gall  says  he  has  remarked,  that  horses  whose  ears 
are  widely  separated  at  the  roots,  are  sure-footed  and  courageous. 
Possibly  the  fact  may  be  true  ;  but  I  cannot  comprehend  the 
connexion  that  may  exist  betwixt  the  outward  mark  and  the 
quality  of  courage,  whose  seat,  in  the  horse,  Gall  indicates  at  a 
point  where  there  is  no  brain.” — Ibid.  281.  “  Spurzheim  indi¬ 

cates  the  region  of  the  frontal  sinuses  as  the  seat  of  gentleness, 
while  courage  is  located  upon  the  muscles  that  go  to  be  inserted 
on  the  os  occipitis.” — Ibid.  p.  117.  Such  are  M.  Vimont’s 


# 


92 


the  brain,*  and  yet  people  are  bold  enough 
to  trace  upon  it  their  circumscriptions,  their 
circles,  their  boundaries.  The  external  sur¬ 
face  of  the  skull  does  not  represent  the  brain’s 

remarks,  yet  this  same  M.  Vimont  inscribes  the  following 
twenty-nine  names  on  the  skull  of  a  goose ! 


1.  Conservation. 

15.  Configuration. 

2.  Choice  of  aliment. 

16.  Extent. 

3.  Destruction. 

17.  Distance. 

4.  Cunning. 

18.  Geometrical  sense. 

5.  Courage. 

19.  Resistance. 

6.  Choice  of  locality. 

20.  Localities. 

7.  Concentration. 

21.  Order. 

8.  Attachment  to  life,  or 

22.  Time. 

marriage. 

23.  Language. 

9.  Attachment. 

24.  Eventuality. 

10.  Reproduction. 

25.  Construction. 

11.  Attachment  to  the  pro¬ 

26.  Musical  talent. 

duct  of  conception. 

27.  Imitation. 

12.  Property. 

28.  Comparison. 

13.  Circumspection. 

29.  Gentleness. 

1 4.  Perception  of  substance. 

“  All  this  upon  the  cranium  of  a  goose !”  says  M.  Leuret 
upon  this  occasion,  (page  355.)  “  And  there  is  no  place  so 

small  but  it  is  occupied . The  faculties  are  so  crowded,” 

adds  he,  “  that  it  would  be  a  marvellous  thing  to  be  able  to 

write  their  names  upon  the  brain . It  would  be  a  greater 

marvel  to  discover  them.” 

*  Gall  himself  says:  “In  whatever  region  we  examine  the 
two  substances  that  compose  the  brain,  it  is  with  difficulty  that 
we  can  discern  any  difference  between  them  as  to  their  struc¬ 
ture,  &c.” — T.  iii.  p.  70. 


93 


surface,  it  is  admitted ;  and  yet  they  inscribe 
upon  this  surface  twenty-seven  names,  each  of 
which  names  is  written  within  a  small  circle, 
each  little  circle  corresponding  to  one  precise 
faculty !  And  what  is  stranger  yet,  people 
are  to  be  found  who,  under  each  of  these 
names  inscribed  by  Gall,  imagine  that  there 
is  concealed  something  more  than  a  name  ! 

Those  who,  seeing  the  success  of  Gall’s  doc¬ 
trine,  imagine  that  the  doctrine  therefore  rests 
upon  some  solid  foundation,  know  very  little 
of  mankind.  Gall  knew  mankind  better.  He 
studied  them  in  his  own  way,  but  he  studied 
them  very  closely.  Let  us  hear  his  own  words  : 

“  In  society,  I  employ  many  expedients  to 
find  out  the  talents  and  inclinations  of  people. 
I  start  the  conversation  upon  a  variety  of 
topics.  In  general,  we  let  fall  in  conversation 
whatsoever  has  little  or  no  concern  with  our 
faculties  and  penchants ;  but  when  the  inter¬ 
locutor  touches  upon  one  of  our  favourite 


94 


subjects,  we  at  once  become  interested  in  it. . . 
Do  you  wish  to  spy  out  the  character  of  a 
person,  without  the  fear  of  being  misled  as  to 
your  conclusions,  even  though  he  might  be 
on  his  guard  ?  Set  him  to  talking  about  his 
childhood  and  boyhood;  make  him  relate  his 
schoolboy  exploits ;  his  conduct  towards  his 
parents,  his  brothers  and  sisters,  and  his  play¬ 
fellows,  and  his  emulators,  .  .  .  Ask  him  about 
his  games,  &c.  Few  persons  think  it  neces¬ 
sary  to  dissemble  upon  these  points ;  they 
do  not  suspect  they  are  dealing  with  one 
♦who  knows  perfectly  well  that  the  basis  of 
character  remains  ever  the  same ;  and  that 
the  objects  only  that  interest  us  change  with 

the  progress  of  years . Besides,  when  I 

discover  what  it  is  that  a  person  admires  or 
despises ;  when  I  see  him  act ;  when  he  is  an 
author,  and  I  merely  read  his  book,  &c.  &c. 
the  whole  man  stands  unveiled  before  me.”* 


*  T.  iii.  p.  63. 


95 


Descartes  shut  himself  up  in  a  stove,*  in 
order  that  he  might  meditate.  According  to 
Gall,  there  is  no  necessity  for  one’s  shutting 
himself  up  in  a  stove. 

Descartes  says:  “Now  I  shall  shut  my  eyes, 
I  shall  stop  my  ears,  I  shall  turn  my  senses 
aside ;  I  shall  even  efface  from  my  memory 
every  image  of  corporeal  objects,  or  at  least, 
as  that  can  hardly  be  done,  I  will  repute  them 
as  vain  and  false ;  and  thus,  shut  up  within 
myself,  and  contemplating  what  is  within  me, 
I  shall  endeavour  gradually  to  become  more 
and  more  familiarly  acquainted  with  my  own 
real  nature. ”t 

According  to  Gall,  there  is  no  occasion  for 
this  absolute  gathering  one’s  self  together 
within.  All  that  is  needful  is  to  look  at 
and  touch  the  skulls  of  people.  Gall’s  doc¬ 
trine  succeeded  just  as  Lavater’s  did.  Men 

*  “  I  remained  a  whole  day  shut  up  in  an  oven.” — T.  i.  133. 

f  T.  i.  p.  263. 


96 


will  always  be  looking  out  for  external  signs 
by  which  to  discover  secret  thoughts  and  con¬ 
cealed  inclinations :  it  is  vain  to  confound  their 
curiosity  upon  this  point :  after  Lavater  came 
Gall  ;  after  Gall  some  one  else  will  appear. 

We  soon  become  wearied  of  a  true  philo¬ 
sophy,  because  it  is  true ;  because  the  search 
after  truth,  of  whatsoever  kind,  requires 
strenuous  and  continual  efforts.  It  is  impos¬ 
sible,  moreover,  always  to  have  the  very  same 
philosophy :  even  the  same  philosopher  cannot 
be  always  approved  of.  Approbation  must 
change  its  object,  especially  in  France. 

It  was  for  the  French  that  Fontenelle  wrote 
these  words :  “  The  approbation  of  mankind 
is  a  sort  of  forced  state,  which  seeks  nothing 
so  much  as  to  come  to  an  end.”* 

Descartes  goes  off  to  die  in  Sweden,  and 
Gall  comes  to  reign  in  France. 


*  Eloge  de  Toumefort. 


OF  SPURZHEIM. 


Spurzheim  published  two  works;  the  first 
of  which  is  entitled,  “  Observations  sur  la 
Phrenologie,  ou  la  connaissance  de  Phomme 
moral  et  intellectuel,  fondee  sur  les  fonctions 
du  systeme  nerveux  the  title  of  the  second 
is,  “Essai  philosophique  sur  la  nature  morale 
et  intellectuelle  de  Phomme  ;”t  and  these  two 
works  are  merely  a  reproduction  of  the  doc- 


*  One  volume,  8vo.  Paris,  1818.  Phrenology  is  the  very 
name  given  by  Spurzheim  to  the  doctrine  of  Gall. 

d 

f  One  volume,  8vo.  Paris,  1820. 

7 


98 


trine  of  Gall.  Spurzheim  makes  Gall’s  book 
over  again — the  same  book  that  they  com¬ 
menced  together — and  abridges  it. 

Spurzheim  tells  us  how  he  heard  Gall,  and 
having  heard  him,  felt  himself  drawn  to  par¬ 
ticipate  in  his  labours,  and  propagate  his 
doctrine. 

“In  1800,  I  attended  for  the  first  time  a 
course  of  lectures  which  M.  Gall  had  from 
time  to  time  repeated  at  Vienna  for  four  years. 
He  spoke  then  of  the  necessity  there  was 
for  a  brain  to  give  out  the  manifestations  of 
the  soul;  and  of  the  plurality  of  organs; 
but  he  had  not  as  yet  begun  to  examine  into 
the  structure  of  the  brain.*  From  the  very 
first,  I  found  myself  much  attracted  by  the 
doctrine  of  the  brain ;  and  from  the  period  of 
my  first  attention  to  that  subject  to  the  present 

moment,  I  have  never  lost  sisrht  of  it  as  an 

* 


*  Observ.  sur  la  Pkrenol.  &c.  p.  8. 


99 


object  of  study.  After  finishing  my  studies  in 
1800,  I  joined  M.  Gall,  in  order  to  pursue  in 
a  special  manner  the  anatomical  part  of  the 
researches.* * * §  In  1805,  we  left  Vienna  for  the 
purpose  of  travelling  together;  from  which 
time,  up  to  the  year  1813,  we  made  our 
observations  in  common/’  &c.t 

In  fact,  the  two  authors,  uniting  their 
labours,  first  published,  in  1808,  their  fine 
memoir  upon  the  anatomy  of  the  brain, J  and 
subsequently,  in  1810  and  1812,  the  two  first 
volumes  of  Gall’s  great  work.§ 

In  the  year  1813  they  separated,  and  that 
separation  even  proved  useful.  Gall,  when 
writing  independently,  has  a  freer  movement. 
Had  he  continued  united  with  Spurzheim,  he 


*  Observ.  sur  la  Phren.  p.  20. 

-j-  Ibid.  p.  22. 

t  Rech.  sur  le  Syst.  Nerv.  en  general,  &c.  par  F.  J.  Gall  et 
G.  Spurzheim. 

§  Anat.  et  Phys.  du  Syst.  Nerveux,  &c.,  the  work  which  has 
been  examined  in  the  three  preceding  articles. 


100 


either  would  not  have  written  the  last  chapter 
of  his  fourth  volume,  or  he  would  have  written 
it  very  differently,  and  we  should  not  have 
obtained  the  definite  expression  of  his  doctrine. 

That  chapter,  entitled  “  Philosophy  of  Man,” 
is  Gall’s  philosophy  entire.  It  is  in  that  chapter 
that  he  says  what  he  does  understand  by  facul¬ 
ties,  by  understanding,  by  will,  &c.  &c.  and 
it  is  there  that  he  defines  the  faculties  of  the 
individual  understandings;*  understanding,  a 
simple  attribute  of  each  faculty ;t  will,  a 
simple  result  of  the  simultaneous  action  of 
superior  faculties,  &c.f 

Spurzheim  never  would  have  imagined  the 
doctrine :  he  found  it  already  concocted ;  he 
follows  it,  and  in  doing  so,  always  hesitates. 
He  did  not  imagine  it ;  and  perhaps  never 
could  have  had  the  facilities  enjoyed  by  Gall 
for  carrying  it  successfully  into  the  world. 

*  T.  iv.  p.  341.  j-  Ibid.  p.  327. 

4  Ibid.  p.  341. 


101 


Gall’s  mind  was  full  of  address.  We  have 
seen  his  method  of  studying  men.*  In  his 
great  work  there  is  a  dominant  tone  of  phi¬ 
losophy  ;  for  the  doctrine  was  already  esta¬ 
blished  at  the  period  of  the  publication  of  that 
work.  When  the  doctrine  was  inchoate,  Gall’s 
tone  was  not  quite  so  grave,  for  it  is  above 
all  things  necessary  to  awaken  the  public 
curiosity,  and  the  philosophic  tone  does  not 
answer  for  that  purpose. 

Charles  Villers  has  preserved  some  of  his 
souvenirs,  touching  the  first  impressions  pro¬ 
duced  by  the  doctrine.!  “If,”  writes  Gall  at 
the  period  in  question,  “  the  exterminating 
angel  was  under  my  orders,  wo  to  Kaestner, 
to  Kant,  to  Wieland,  and  others  like  them.  .  .  . 
Why  is  it,  that  no  one  has  ever  preserved 


*  In  the  preceding  article,  p.  93. 

f  Lettre  de  Charles  Villers  a  Georges  Cuvier,  sur  une 
nouvelle  theorie  du  cerveau,  par  le  Docteur  Gall,  &c.  Metz, 
1802. 


i 


102 

for  our  times,  the  skulls  of  Ilomer,  Virgil, 
Cicero,  &c.  ?”* 

“  At  one  time,”  says  Charles  Villers,  “  every 
body  in  Vienna  was  trembling  for  his  head, 
and  fearing  that  after  his  death  it  would  be 
put  in  requisition  to  enrich  Dr.  Gall’s  cabinet. 
He  announced  his  impatience  as  to  the  skulls 
of  extraordinary  persons — such  as  were  distin¬ 
guished  by  certain  great  qualities  or  by  great 
talents — which  was  still  greater  cause  for  the 
general  terror.  Too  many  people  were  led  to 
suppose  themselves  the  objects  of  the  doctor’s 
regards,  and  imagined  their  heads  to  be  espe¬ 
cially  longed  for  by  him,  as  a  specimen  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  the  success  of  his  ex¬ 
periments.  Some  very  curious  stories  are  told 
on  this  point.  Old  M.  Denis,  the  Emperor's 
librarian,  inserted  a  special  clause  in  his  will, 
intended  to  save  his  cranium  from  M.  Gall's 
scalpel.”! 


*  Lettre  de  Charles  Villers,  &c.  p.  34. 


f  Ibid. 


103 


Gall  and  Spurzheim  differ  from  each  other 
upon  several  points :  upon  the  offices  of  the 
external  senses  ;  upon  the  names  of  the  facul¬ 
ties  of  the  soul ;  upon  their  number ;  and  upon 
the  classification  of  the  faculties,  &c.  Let 
us  examine  a  few  of  the  points  more  par¬ 
ticularly. 

1.  Offices  of  the  external  senses.  “  M.  Gall 
is  disposed,”  says  Spurzheim,  “  to  attribute  to 
the  external  senses,  as  well  as  to  each  and 
every  internal  faculty,  not  only  perception, 
but  also  memory,  reminiscence,  and  judgment. 
.  ...  It  seems  to  me  that  such  facts  (the  facts 
cited  by  Gall)  do  not  prove  the  conclusion. 
In  the  first  place,  memory,  being  nothing  more 
than  the  repetition  of  knowledge,  must  have 
its  seat  in  the  point  where  perception  takes 
place.  The  impressions  of  the  nerves  that 
give  rise  to  the  sensation  of  hunger,  &c.  are 
indisputably  perceived  in  the  head,  which 
likewise  has  the  reminiscence  of  hunger . 


104 


I  do  not  believe  we  can  conclude  that  the  eyes 
or  the  ears  are  the  seats  of  reminiscence.”* 
Spurzheim  is  right,  as  we  have  sufficiently 
seen;t  perception  is  not  in  the  organ  of  the 
sense. 

But  the  error  that  Spurzheim  combats  is  not 
the  whole  of  Gall’s  error  ;  it  is  only  a  particu¬ 
lar  and  secondary  error  :±  the  error  that  he 
does  not  perceive,  the  error  that  he  follows,  is 
a  general  and  capital  one.  From  the  inde¬ 
pendence  of  the  external  senses,  Gall  concludes 
the  independence  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul : 
he  reasons  upon  an  apparent  analogy,  which 
conceals  a  profound  dissimilitude ;  and  Spurz¬ 
heim  reasons  just  as  Gall  does.  *  N 

“  In  the  nervous  system,”  says  he,  “  we 
find  the  five  external  senses  separate  and 

*  Observ.  sur  la  Phren.,  &c.  p.  10. 
f  Especially  in  the  last  article. 

$  And  which  was  not  taken  up  by  Gall,  except  from  the 
necessity  he  was  under  of  assimilating  at  all  points  the  external 
senses  with  the  faculties  of  the  soul. 


105 


independent  of  each  other. ”*  “  The  faculties 

of  the  external  senses  are  attached  to  different 
organs  ;  they  may  exist  separately.  The  same 
holds  true  of  the  internal  senses. ”t  “We 
assert  that  there  is  a  particular  organ  for 
each  species  of  sentiment  or  thought,  as  there 
is  for  each  species  of  exterior  sensation.”:): 

Like  Gall,  Spurzheim  denominates  the  facul¬ 
ties  of  the  soul  internal  senses;  in  the  same 
spirit  he  says :  “  The  sense  of  colour ,  the 
sense  of  number ,  sense  of  language ,  sense  of 
comparison ,  sense  of  causality ,”§  &c.  &c. 

Both  authors  begin  by  calling  the  faculties 
of  the  soul  internal  senses;  and  then,  misled 
by  the  word,  they  conclude  from  the  indepen¬ 
dence  of  the  external  senses ,  to  the  indepen¬ 
dence  of  their  internal  senses;  that  is  to  say, 
the  independence  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul. 

*  Observ.  sur  la  Phren.,  &c.  p.  65.  f  Ibid.  p.  67. 

$  Ibid.  p.  75. 

§  See  particularly  the  Essai  philosophique  sur  la  morale  et 
intellectuelle  de  l’homme,  p.  54,  et  seq. 


10G 


2.  Names  of  the  faculties .  Spurzheim  ac¬ 
cuses  Gall  of  having  given  denominations  only 
to  actions,  and  not  to  the  principles  of  those 
actions. 

“Finding,”  says  he,  “a  relation  betwixt 
the  development  of  a  cerebral  part  and  a 
sort  of  action,  M.  Gall  denominated  the  cere¬ 
bral  part  from  the  action ;  thus,  he  spoke  of 
the  organs  of  music,  poetry,  &c.”*  “  The 

nomenclature,”  says  he  further,  “ought  to 
be  conformed  to  the  faculties,  without  regard 
to  any  action  whatever. .  .  .  When  we  attribute 
to  an  organ  cunning,  management,  hypocrisy, 
intrigue,  &c.  we  do  not  make  known  the 
primary  faculty  which  contributes  to  all  these 
modified  actions.”! 

Gall  replies :  “  M.  Spurzheim  cannot  have 
forgotten  how  often  we  reasoned  without  end, 
with  a  view  to  determine  the  primitive  desti- 


*  Observ.  sur  la  Phrcn.  p.  17. 


f  Ibid.  p.  127. 


107 


nation  of  an  organ . I  confess,  that  there 

are  several  organs,  with  whose  primary  facul¬ 
ties  I  am  not  yet  acquainted ;  and  I  continue 
to  denominate  them  from  the  degree  of  activity 
that  led  me  to  the  discovery  of  them.  M. 
Spurzheim  thinks  himself  more  fortunate :  his 
metaphysical  temperament  has  led  him  to  the 
discovery  of  the  fundamental  or  primitive 
faculty  of  every  one  of  the  organs.  Let  us 
put  it  to  the  proof.”* 

Indeed,  Spurzheim’s  expedient  for  render¬ 
ing  himself  master  of  the  primary  faculties  is 
very  simple.  He  creates  a  word :  he  calls  the 
instinct  of  propagation  amativity ,  the  pro¬ 
pensity  to  steal,  convoitivity ;  courage  is  com - 
bativity ,  &c.  &c. 

Gall  and  Spurzheim  talk  a  great  deal  about 
nomenclature  ;  but  they  do  not  perceive,  that 
as  to  nomenclature,  the  first  difficulty,  and 

*  Anat.  et  Phys.  du  Syst.  Nerv.,  &c.  t.  iii.  p.  19.  This 
volume  came  out  the  same  year  as  Spurzheim’s  Observ.,  &c. 


108 


indeed  the  only  one,  is  to  get  at  simple  facts. 
Whoever  has  come  to  simple  facts,  is  very 
nigh  to  a  good  nomenclature. 

Descartes  says :  “  Had  some  one  clearly 
explained  the  simple  ideas  that  exist  in  the 
imagination  of  men,  and  which  constitute  all 
that  they  think,  I  should  venture  to  hope  for 
a  language  that  it  would  be  very  easy  to 
learn,  ....  and,  which  is  the  principal  matter, 
that  would  assist  the  judgment,  representing  to 
it  things  so  distinctly  that  it  would  be  almost 
impossible  for  it  to  be  deceived ;  whereas,  on 
the  contrary,  the  words  we  now  have  possess, 
so  to  speak,  only  confused  significations,  to 
which  the  human  mind  has  been  so  long  ac¬ 
customed,  that  it  therefore  understands  scarcely 
any  thing  perfectly  well.”* 

3.  Number  of  the  faculties .  Spurzheim 
adds  eight  faculties  to  those  established  by 


*  T.  iv.  p.  67. 


109 


Gall,  and  Gall  is  vexed  by  it.  One  does  not 
see  why. 

What !  Shall  Gall  endow  twenty-seven 
faculties,  and  Spurzheim  not  have  the  same 
privilege  for  seven  or  eight  ?*  Shall  Gall  have 
a  faculty  for  space ,  one  for  number ,  &c.  and 
Spurzheim  be  refused  one  for  time,  one  for 
extent ,  &c.  ?  Is  not  Spurzheim  half  right, 
when  he  says : 

“  One  does  not  readily  perceive  why  M.  Gall 
should  desire  to  suggest  to  his  readers  that  his 


*  The  eight  organs  added  by  Spurzheim,  are  the  organs  of 
habitativity,  order,  time,  right,  supernaturality,  hope,  extent, 
weight.  Gall’s  remarks  upon  these  eight  organs  proposed  by 
Spurzheim  are  as  follows :  “  M.  Spurzheim,  it  is  true,  recog¬ 
nises  eight  organs  more  than  I  admit.  As  to  the  organs  of 
habitativity,  order,  time,  and  supernaturality,  I  have  already 
spoken.  I  admit  an  organ  of  the  moral  sense,  or  sense  of 
right  ( juste ),  but  I  have  very  strong  reasons  for  believing 
that  benevolence  is  nothing  more  than  a  very  strong  manifesta¬ 
tion  of  the  moral  sense ;  therefore  I  treat  these  two  organs 
under  the  rubric  of  a  single  organ.  What  M.  Spurzheim 
says  on  the  organs  of  hope,  of  extent,  and  of  weight,  has 
not  as  yet  convinced  me:  and,  in  fact,  he  has  hitherto  proved 
nothing  in  respect  to  them.” — T.  iii.  p.  25. 


110 


method  of  treating  the  doctrine  of  the  brain 
is  the  only  admissible  one,  and  that  there  are 
no  other  organs  than  those  he  has  recognised : 
that  the  organs  do  nothing  but  what  he  attri¬ 
butes  to  them ;  .  .  .  .  that  all  he  says  and  all 
he  does  (and  that  only)  bears  the  stamp  of 
perfection ;  and  that  his  decision  constitutes 
the  supreme  law.”* 

4.  Classification  and  attributes  of  the 
faculties .  Gall,  by  giving  the  same  attributes 
to  all  the  faculties,  and  to  each  faculty  all  the 
attributes  of  the  understanding,  in  fact  forms 
out  of  the  faculties  only  two  groups  :  the  group 
of  faculties  that  he  supposes  common  to  man 
and  the  animals,  and  the  group  of  faculties 
that  he  supposes  to  be  proper  to  man  alone. 
Spurzheim  divides  and  subdivides  them. 

None  of  the  formulas  required  for  the  clas¬ 
sification  agreed  upon  are  omitted.! 

*  Essai  Philosophique,  &c.  p.  216. 

j-  See  the  Essai  Philosophique,  &c.  p.  47,  et  scq. 


Ill 


In  the  first  place,  there  are  two  orders  of 

4 

faculties :  the  affective  and  the  intellectual 
faculties;  then  each  of  these  orders  is  divided 
into  genera .  The  first  order  has  two  genera : 
the  affective  faculties  common  to  man  and 
animals,*  and  the  affective  faculties  peculiar 
to  man  alone. t  The  second  has  three  genera : 
the  faculties  or  internal  senses  which  make 
external  objects  known  the  faculties  or 
internal  senses  which  make  known  the  rela¬ 
tions  of  objects  in  general  ;§  and  the  faculties 
or  internal  senses  that  reflect. \ 

*  The  sense  of  Amativity,  the  sense  of  Philogeniture,  the 
sense  of  Destructivity,  the  sense  of  Affectivity,  the  sense  of 
Thievishness,  the  sense  of  Secretivity,  the  sense  of  Circum¬ 
spection,  the  sense  of  Approbation,  the  sense  of  Self-love. 
(What  a  chaos,  and  what  words !) 

f  The  sense  of  Benevolence,  the  sense  of  Veneration,  the 
sense  of  Firmness,  the  sense  of  Duty,  the  sense  of  Hope,  the 
sense  of  the  Marvellous,  the  sense  of  Ideality,  the  sense  of 
Gaiety,  the  sense  of  Imitation. 

f  The  sense  of  Individuality,  of  Extent,  of  Configuration,  of 
Consistence,  of  Weight,  of  Colour.  f 

§  The  sense  of  Localities,  of  Numeration,  of  Order,  of 
Phenomena,  of  Time,  of  Method,  of  Artificial  Language. 

||  The  sense  of  Comparison,  the  sense  of  Causality. 


112 


What  an  apparatus  for  saying  very  simple 
things ;  for  saying  that  there  are  propensi¬ 
ties  * * * §  sentiments ,t  and  intellectual  faculties! 
What  singular  personification  of  all  these 
faculties :  faculties  that  know ;  faculties  that 
reflectlf  Spurzheim  elsewhere  speaks  of 
happy  faculties .§  Indeed,  what  arbitrariness 
in  the  distribution  of  facts !  And  Gall,  too, 
is  he  not  half  right? 

“By  what  right,”  says  he,  “does  M.  Spurz¬ 
heim  exclude  from  the  intellectual  faculties 
imitation,  wit,  ideality  or  poetry,  circumspec¬ 
tion,  secretivity,  constructivity  ?  How  are  per¬ 
severance,  circumspection,  imitation;  how  are 


*  “  Some  of  the  affective  faculties  produce  only  a  desire,  an 
inclination.  ...  I  shall  call  them  propensities.’' — Observ.  sur  la 
Phrenol.,  &c.  p.  124. 

■f  “  Other  affective  faculties  are  not  restricted  to  a  simple 
inclination,  but  something  beyond ;  which  is  what  is  called 
sentiment  or  feeling." — Ibid. 

i  “  The  intellectual  faculties  are  also  double :  some  of  them 
know;  others  reflect." — Essai  Philosophique,  &c.  p.  225. 

§  “The  faculties  peculiar  to  man  are  happy  in  themselves, 
per  se.” — Ibid.  p.  167. 


113 


they  sentiments?  What  reason  have  we  for 
counting  among  the  propensities  construe- 
tivity  rather  than  melody,  benevolence,  or 
imitation  ?* 

Gall,  by  endowing  each  faculty  with  all  the 
attributes  of  an  understanding,  makes  as  many 
understandings  as  faculties.  Spurzheim  makes 
several  kinds  of  understandings :  understand¬ 
ings  that  know,  understandings  that  reflect, 
&c.  He  restores  the  sensitive  and  rational 
souls . 

In  fine,  Gall  and  Spurzheim  rarely  agree 
as  to  their  faculties.  In  hope  Gall  sees  nothing 
more  than  an  attribute ;  Spurzheim  beholds  it 
as  a  primary  faculty.  In  conscience  Gall  sees 
nothing  but  an  effect  of  benevolence;  Spurz¬ 
heim  looks  upon  it  as  a  peculiar  faculty. 
Gall  resolves  that  there  is  only  one  organ  of 
religion ,  and  Spurzheim  insists  upon  three — 


*  Anat.  et  Phys.  du  Syst.  Nerv.  &c.  t.  iii.  p.  27. 

8 


114 


the  organ  of  causality,  that  of  supernaturality, 
and  that  of  veneration,  &c.  &c. 

We  should  never  end,  were  we  to  follow 
them  throughout  their  debates.  I  have  said 
enough  to  show  the  case,  and  I  now  pass 
on  to  Broussais. 


OF  BROUSSAIS. 


Broussais  appears  to  have  been  born  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  imagining  or  propagating 
systems. 

Guided  by  facts  which  he  seized  upon  with 
a  rare  sagacity,  Broussais  begins  by  bringing 
back  certain  affections  to  their  real  seats;* 
but  soon,  by  an  immoderate  generalization  of 
this  fine  result,  he  perceives  all  affections  in 
the  same  affection,  all  diseases  in  the  same 


*  See  his  Histoire  des  Phlegmas.  Chron.  1808. 


116 


malady;  he  imagines  one  abstract  affection , 
by  means  of  which  he  explains  all  other 
affections :  fevers  are  nothing  but  irritations 
of  the  digestive  apparatus ;  insanity  is  nothing 
but  an  irritation  of  the  brain  ;*  and  he  who 
is  so  intolerant  of  the  personifications  pro¬ 
posed  by  others,  makes  one  personification 
more  ;  in  fine,  his  exclusive  and  headstrong 
genius  carries  him  beyond  himself,  and,  as  if 
merely  to  amuse  him  after  the  fatigue  of  form¬ 
ing  his  systems,  plunges  him  into  the  question 
of  phrenology ,  where  he  enjoys  himself  so 
much  the  more,  because  he  finds  in  it  his 
own  *  accustomed  method,  his  own  ideas,  and 
his  own  language  :  there  are  plenty  of  faculties 
to  bring  back  to  their  organs,  plenty  of  locali¬ 
zations  to  establish. 

Broussais  ought  not  to  be  judged  of  by  his 
“  Cours  de  Phrenologie.”t  The  five  or  six 

*  See  his  work  entitled,  “  De  l’lrritation  et  de  la  Folie,”  1828. 

|  Cours  de  Phrenologie,  1  vol.  8vo.  1836. 


117 


first  lessons,  or,  as  he  calls  them,  generalities ,* * * § 
are  merely  a  confused  mixture  of  ideas:  the 
notions  of  Condillac  rejected  by  Cabanis,  and 
the  ideas  of  the  phrenologists. 

He  says  that  sensibility  is  the  common 
origin  of  the  faculties  ;t  he  calls  perception 
a  primary  faculty ,t  &c.  &c. ;  and  Condillac 
would  not  speak  differently. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  he  says  that  there 
are  as  many  memories  as  there  are  organs  ;§ 
that  the  instincts  and  the  sentiments  possess 
a  memory,  as  the  external  perceptions ||  have 
theirs;  that  the  mind  is  the  sum  of  the  facul¬ 
ties ,1  &c. ;  and  Gall  could  not  say  it  more 
clearly. 


*  Cours  de  Phrenologie,  p.  82. 

f  Ibid.  p.  140. 

t  Ibid.  p.  37. 

§  “  Memory  is  not  an  isolated  faculty ;  and  there  are  as  many 
memories  as  organs.” — p.  131. 

||  “  The  instincts  and  the  sentiments  have  a  memory  as  well 
as  the  external  perceptions.” — p.  36. 

Tf  “ .  .  .  .  The  study  of  the  human  mind,  not  indeed  that  of  a 


118 


Broussais  is  particularly  opposed  to  the  moi 
of  Descartes.  “ Seduced,”  says  he,  “by  the 
moi  of  Descartes,  philosophers  have  been  led 
to  reason  according  to  the  testimony  of  their 
consciousness.  .  .  And  according  to  what 
testimony  does  Broussais  think  they  ought  to 
reason  ? 

He  thinks  it  very  funny  to  call  the  moi  an 
intra-cranial  entity ,t  intra-cranial  central 
being,\  person  par  excellence,  &c.§ 

He  laughs  at  the  moi  of  Descartes;  he 
forgets  that  the  moi  of  Gall  is  either  no¬ 
thing  else  than  the  sum  ( ensemble )  of  the 
intellectual  faculties,  or  nothing  else  than  a 
word ;  and  he  makes  for  himself  a  peculiar 

fictitious  one  bearing  this  mysterious  appellation,  but  of  the 
ensemble  of  the  mental  faculties  of  man.” — p.  82. 

*  Page  48. 

\  “  The  favorers  of  the  intra-cranial  entity.” — p.  1 53. 

$  “  Their  central  intra-cranial  being,  to  which  they  attribute 
all  their  faculties.” 

§  “  Suppose  they  had  called  this  being  po'son  par  excel¬ 
lence.  .  .  .” — p.  75. 


119 


moi,*  which  he  locates  in  the  organ  of  com¬ 
parison.  “  We  owe,”  says  he,  “  to  the  organ 
of  general  comparison  the  distinction  of  one 
person  expressed  by  the  sign  me.” t 

Broussais  was  never  designed  for  compliance 
with  the  ideas  of  others ;  a  yoke  oppresses 
him ;  he  is  never  truly  Broussais,  except  in 
the  midst  of  conflict.  In  1816  he  publishes  a 
volume, X  and  the  medical  doctrines  are  shook 


*  Let  us  examine,  as  to  this  particular  ( moi )  me,  all  Brous- 
sais’s  variorums.  In  one  place  the  me  comes  from  only  one 
organ — the  organ  of  general  comparison  :  “We  owe  to  the 
organ  of  general  comparison  the  distinction  of  our  person 
expressed  by  the  sign  me.’5 — Cours  de  Phren.,  p.  684.  Further 
on  it  comes  from  two — the  organ  of  comparison  and  the  organ 
of  causality :  “  The  organ  of  causality  is  as  necessary  to  the 
distinction  of  the  rae,  and  of  the  person ,  as  the  organ  of  general 
comparison.” — Ibid.  p.  685.  Next  there  is  no  organ  at  all : 
“  To  assign  to  the  me  a  special  organ  appears  to  me  to  be  out 
of  the  question.” — Ibid.  p.  119.  And  then  it  comes  from  every 
where :  “  There  is  no  special  and  central  organ,  and  our 
perception  of  ourselves  has  for  its  basis  the  sensitive  percep¬ 
tions.” — Ibid.  p.  119. 

f  Cours  de  Phrenologie,  p.  684. 

4  Examen  de  la  Doctrine  Medicale,  etc.  1816. 


120 


for  half  a  century :  we  ought  to  read  that 

volume  over  again,  and  forget  the  “Cours 

« 

de  Phr^nologie.” 


4 


VI. 

BROUSSAIS’S  PSYCOLOGY. 

'  The  fact  is,  Broussais  is  busier  with  his 
own  opinions  than  with  what  Gall  thought ; 
and  here  is  a  specimen  of  his  way  of  think¬ 
ing  :  u  The  understanding  and  its  different 
manifestations  are,”  says  he,  “  the  phenomena 
of  the  nervous  actions.”*  “The  faculties,” 
says  he  further,  “  are  the  actions  of  the  mate¬ 
rial  organs, ”t  &c. 


*  Cours  de  Phrenologie,  p.  717. 

f  Cours  de  Phrenologie,  p.  77.  He  also  says,  “  Their  central 
intra-cranial  being,  to  which  they  attribute  all  the  faculties  of  a 


122 


Broussais’s  whole  psycology  is  contained  in 
these  words.  The  organ,  and  the  phenome¬ 
non  produced  by  the  organ.  To  speak  more 
clearly,  the  organ  and  the  action  of  the 
organ.  To  speak  like  Cabanis,  the  organ 
and  the  secretion  of  the  organ,  or  thought  * 
That’s  all ! 

The  understanding,  therefore,  is  merely  a 
phenomenon ,  a  product,  an  act.  But  if  this 
be  the  case,  how  can  there  be  a  continuity 


man,  is  not  cognisable  by  any  of  our  senses, ...  it  is  therefore  a 
pure  hypothesis.” — Ibid.  p.  153.  Thus  there  is  no  mind  (pure 
hypothesis);  no  faculties  but  those  of  the  organs  (the  faculties 
are  the  acts  of  material  organs )  ;  no  understanding,  except  as 
a  simple  phenomenon  of  the  nervous  action  (understanding 
and  all  its  manifestations  are  phenomena  of  nervous  action) ; 
consequently,  there  is  no  psycology  ;  there  is  nothing  but  phy¬ 
siology  ;  and  even  (for  it  should  be  clearly  understood)  nothing 
but  Broussais’s  physiology. 

*  “  In  order  to  form  for  one’s  self  a  just  notion  of  the  opera¬ 
tions  which  result  in  the  production  of  thought,  it  is  necessary 
to  conceive  of  the  brain  as  a  peculiar  organ,  specially  designed 
for  the  production  thereof,  just  as  the  stomach  is  designed  to 
effect  digestion,  the  liver  to  form  the  bile,  &c." — Cabanis, 
Rapports  du  Physique  et  du  moral  de  l’homme,  II  me- 
moire,  §  vii. 


123 


of  the  moi?  Now,  the  consciousness  which 
gives  me  the  unity  of  the  moi ,  gives  me 
not  less  assuredly  the  continuity  of  the  moi . 
Descartes’  admirable  words  are  :  “  I  find  that 
there  is  in  us  an  intellectual  memory.”* 


The  consciousness  tells  me  that  I  am  one , 

0 

and  Gall  insists  that  I  am  multiple;  the  con¬ 
sciousness  tells  me  I  am  free ,  and  Gall  avers 
that  there  is  no  moral  liberty;  the  conscious¬ 
ness  endows  me  with  the  continuity  of  my 


*  Whence  he  concludes  still  more  admirably,  to  the  immor¬ 
tality  of  the  soul.  “  I  cannot,’5  says  he,  “  conceive  otherwise 
of  those  who  die,  than  that  they  pass  into  a  more  pleasing  and 
tranquil  life  than  ours,  even  carrying  with  them  the  remem¬ 
brance  of  the  past :  for  I  find  there  is  within  us  an  intellectual 

memory . And  although  religion  teaches  us  many  things 

upon  this  subject,  I  must,  notwithstanding,  confess  my  infirmity 
on  this  point,  which  it  appears  to  me  that  I  possess  in  common 
with  most  people,  which  is,  that  although  we  might  wish  to 
believe,  and  even  might  suppose  ourselves  to  be  firm  believers 
in  the  doctrines  of  religion,  we  are  not  so  deeply  touched  with 
those  things  that  are  taught  by  faith  alone,  and  which  our  mere 
reason  cannot  attain,  as  by  those  that  are  instilled  into  us  by 
natural  and  very  evident  reasons.” — T.  viii.  p.  684. 


124 


understanding,  but  Cabanis  and  Broussais  tell 
me  that  my  understanding  is  nothing  but 
an  act . 

Philosophers  will  talk. 


VII. 


BROUSSAIS’S  PHYSIOLOGY. 

The  whole  of  Broussais’s  physiology  is 
founded  upon  irritation .  He  says,  Irrita¬ 
tion  constitutes  the  basis  of  the  physiological 
doctrine.”*  But  what  is  irritation  ?  Broussais 
replies;  “It  is  the  exaggeration  of  contrac¬ 
tility.^!  But  then,  what  is  contractility  ? 

In  Haller,  the  term  irritability  (for  that  is 
his  term  for  contractility)  possesses  a  precise 
meaning  and  import.  Irritability  is  a  pro- 

*  De  limitation  et  de  la  Folie,  p.  4. 

|  “  The  exaggeration  of  the  phenomena  of  contractility  is 
what  constitutes  irritation.” — Ibid.  p.  77. 


12G 


perty  of  muscular  fibre,  by  which  it  shortens 
or  contracts  itself  when  touched. 

Haller  demonstrated,  and  it  is  his  glory, 
that  the  muscle  alone  moves  when  it  is 
touched.  What  is  that  to  Broussais  ?  He 
goes  back  again  to  the  vague  irritability  of 
Glisson  and  de  Gorter :  like  those  authors,  he 
assigns  it  to  every  tissue,  and,  like  them,  he 
explains  every  thing  by  means  of  it. 

Broussais’s  irritation  is  merely  Haller's 
irritability  exaggerated  and  deformed. 

The  genius  of  Broussais  was  too  impatient 
to  allow  him  to  proceed  step  by  step  up  to 
the  idea — too  impassioned  to  hinder  him  from 
being  satisfied  with  the  name — and  for  that 
very  reason  he  appears  to  have  been  by  nature 
fitted  for  success  in  a  school  where  the  name 
is  every  thing. 

But  here  is  the  great  difference.  Gall  and 
Broussais  laboured  for  the  School :  Descartes 
toiled  for  the  human  mind. 


I  RETURN  tO  Gall. 

Those  who  wish  to  learn  GalPs  doctrine, 
will  always  go  up  to  Gall  himself.  Spurz- 
heim  already  alters  the  spirit  of  that  doctrine, 
and  Gall  complains  of  it.  “  M.  Spurzheim,” 
says  he,  “  knows  my  discoveries  better  than 
any  body  else,  but  he  tries  to  introduce  among 
them  a  spirit  quite  foreign  to  that  in  which 
they  were  begun,  continued  and  perfected.”* 


*  Anat.  et  Physiol,  du  Systeme  Nerveux,  &c.  iii.  15. 


128 


Gall,  moreover,  was  a  great  anatomist.  His 
idea  of  tracing  the  fibres  of  the  brain  is,  as  to 
the  anatomy  of  that  organ,  the  fundamental 
idea.  The  idea  is  not  his  own:  two  French 
anatomists,  Vieussens  and  Pourfour  du  Petit, 
had  admirably  understood  it  long  before  his 
time ;  but  at  the  period  of  his  appearance  it 
had  been  long  forgotten.  The  brain  was  not 
then  dissected  by  any  one :  it  was  cut  in  slices. 

It  was  a  great  merit  in  Gall  to  have  recalled 
the  true  method  of  dissecting  the  brain;  and 
there  was  still  greater  address  on  his  part,  in 
connecting  with  his  labours  in  positive  ana¬ 
tomy,  his  doctrine  of  independent  faculties  and 
multiple  brain. 

This  strange  doctrine  has  had  a  fortune  still 
more  strange.  Gall  and  Spurzheim  forgot  to 
place  curiosity  among  their  primary  faculties. 
They  were  wrong.  But  for  the  credulous 
curiosity  of  mankind,  how  could  they  have 
explained  the  success  of  their  doctrine  ? 


129 


Fortunately,  a  system  never  lives  otherwise 
than  as  a  system  lives.  That  of  the  moment 
is  abandoned  for  the  sake  of  another :  and 
almost  always  for  a  perfectly  opposite  one. 
Systems  multiply  and  pass  away ;  and  we 
are  indebted  to  the  systems  themselves  for  an 
escape  from  the  mischiefs  of  systems. 


9 


»  ♦  > 


t 


V  •  I 


* 


NOTES. 


NOTE  I. 

Anatomical  Relations  supposed  by  Gall  to  exist 

BETWEEN  THE  ORGANS  OF  THE  EXTERNAL  SENSES, 

and  the  Organs  of  the  Intellectual  Faculties. 

Page  82.  According  to  Gall ,  the  origin ,  the  deve¬ 
lopment,  the  structure  and  mode  of  termination,  as  to 
the  organs  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul  and  the  organs 
of  the  external  senses,  every  thing  is  similar,  every 
thing  is  in  common . 

It  is  known  that  two  substances  compose  the  nervous 
system — the  gray  matter,  and  the  white  or  fibrous  mat¬ 
ter.  Well,  according  to  Gall,  one  of  these  substances 
produces  the  other.  The  gray  matter  produces  the 
white  matter . 

Wherever,  therefore,  there  happens  to  be  any  gray 
matter,  white  matter  must  appear ;  that  is  to  say, 
nervous  fibres ,*  nervous  filaments ,  nerves.  All  the 

*The  white  matter  is  every  where  fibrous.  No  person  has 
contributed  more  than  Gall  to  the  demonstration  of  this  great 
fact.  He  justly  remarks:  “  Those  authors  who,  with  Soemmer¬ 
ing  and  Cuvier,  &c.,  recognise  the  fibrous  structure  of  the  brain, 
in  many  of  its  parts,  have  nevertheless,  not  yet  ventured  to  say 
that  it  is  so  in  all  its  parts.” — T.  i.  235. 


132 


nerves  in  the  body  must  arise  in  this  way.  The  spinal 
nerves  arise  from  the  gray  matter  which  is  in  the  in¬ 
terior  of  the  spinal  marrow ;  the  cerebral  nerves  from 
the  gray  matter  that  is  in  the  interior  of  the  medulla 
oblongata. 

Hence,  the  nerves  of  the  body  are  organs  of  the  senses . 

On  the  other  hand,  the  brain  and  the  cerebellum,* 
which  are  the  organs  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul ,  must 
arise  like  the  nerves :  the  brain  from  the  gray  matter 
of  the  pyramidal  eminences  ;  the  cerebellum  from  the 
gray  matter  that  surrounds  the  restiform  bodies . 

In  the  second  place,  whenever  a  nerve  traverses  a 
mass  of  gray  matter,  it  receives  from  it,  according  to 
Gall,  certain  new  nervous  filaments ;  and  in  this  way 
it  grows  and  developes  itself.  The  cerebrum  and  cere¬ 
bellum  will  not  fail  therefore  to  grow  and  be  developed 
likewise.  The  primitive  bundles  of  the  cerebellum, 
( the  restiform  bodies ,)  will  grow  by  means  of  the  fila¬ 
ments  which  will  be  imparted  to  them  by  the  gray 
matter  of  the  ciliary  body :  the  primitive  bundles  of 
the  cerebrum,  (the  pyramidal  eminences ,)  by  the  fila¬ 
ments  imparted  to  them  by,  first,  the  gray  matter  of  the 
pons  varolii ;  secondly,  by  that  of  the  optic  strata  ; 
and  then  by  that  of  the  olivary  bodies,  corpora  striata , 
&c.  &c. 

Finally,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  nerve  of  sense 
expands  at  its  termination,  and  by  means  of  such  ex- 

*  The  cerebellum  serves  only  for  the  motions  of  locomotion. 
(See  the  first  article  of  this  work.)  But,  I  am  here  setting  forth 
Gall’s  opinions. 


133 


pansion  forms  the  organ  of  the  sense,  so  the  primitive 
bundles  of  fibres  of  the  brain  and  of  the  cerebellum 
terminate  in  expansions,  and  constitute  the  organs 
of  the  internal  senses  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  lobes  of  the 
cerebellum  and  the  hemispheres  of  the  brain.* 

NOTE  II. 

Difference  between  Instinct  and  Understanding. 

Page  64  (Note),  find  he  does  not  see  that  as  to 
the  instincts  and  the  understanding  all  is  contrast . 

Here  is  what  I  have  elsewhere  said  upon  this  ques- 

*  “  The  particular  systems  of  the  brain  terminate  in  fibrous 
expansions  arranged  in  layers,  just  as  the  other  nervous  systems 
expand  in  fibres  at  their  peripheral  extremity.” — T.  i.  318.  “All 
the  diverging  bundles  of  the  brain,  after  they  come  out  from 
the  last  apparatus  of  reinforcement,  expand  in  layers  and  form 
convolutions.” — T.  i.  283.  “  The  nerves  of  sensation  and  mo¬ 

tion  expand  in  the  skin  and  the  muscles  ;  the  nerves  of  the 
senses,  each  in  the  external  instrument  to  which  they  belong : 
for  example,  the  pituitary  membrane  upon  the  bones  of  the  nose  : 
the  nerve  of  taste  in  the  tongue,  and  the  expansion  of  the  optic 

nerve  in  the  retina . Nature  obeys  precisely  the  same 

law  in  the  brain.  The  different  parts  of  the  brain  originate  and 
are  reinforced  at  different  points ;  they  form  fibrous  bundles  of 
various  sizes,  which  terminate  in  expansions.  All  these  expan¬ 
sions  of  the  various  bundles  constitute,  when  reunited,  the  hemi¬ 
spheres  of  the  brain.” — T.  iii.  p.  3. 

I  here  speak  only  of  the  diverging  fibres.  Coming  from  the 
interior,  they  proceed  towards  the  exterior  :  the  converging  fibres 
coming  from  the  exterior,  that  is,  according  to  Gall,  from  the 
gray  matter  that  envelopes  the  brain  and  the  cerebellum,  are 
directed  inwards.  The  former  constitute  the  convolutions, 
while  the  latter  compose  the  commissures.  But  I  shall,  further 
on,  return  to  this  subject. 


134 


tion,  so  long  debated,  of  the  instinct  and  understand¬ 
ing  of  animals . 

“  There  is  a  most  complete  difference  between 
instinct  and  understanding. 

“  In  instinct  all  is  blind,  necessary,  and  invariable. 
In  understanding  every  thing  is  elective,  conditional, 
and  modifiable. 

“The  beaver  which  builds  its  house,  and  the  bird 
that  constructs  its  nest,  act  only  by  instinct. 

“  The  dog  and  the  horse,  that  learn  even  the  mean¬ 
ing  of  several  of  our  words,  and  who  pay  obedience 
to  us,  do  so  by  understanding. 

“  In  instinct  all  is  innate.  The  beaver  builds  with¬ 
out  having  learned  to  build :  all  that  he  does  is  from 
fatality.  The  beaver  builds  under  the  impulsion  of  a 
constant  and  irresistible  force. 

“  In  understanding ,  every  thing  results  from  expe¬ 
rience  and  instruction.  The  dog  obeys  only  because 
he  has  learned  to  obey :  he  is  perfectly  free  in  this 
respect ;  for  he  obeys  only  because  he  will  obey. 

“Finally,  in  regard  to  instinct  every  thing  is  parti¬ 
cular.  That  admirable  industry  that  the  beaver  exhi¬ 
bits  in  the  construction  of  his  hut,  can  be  employed  in 
no  other  occupation  than  the  building  of  his  hut.  Now. 
in  understanding  every  thing  is  general ;  for  the  dog 
could  apply  the  same  flexibility  of  attention,  and  of 
conception,  which  he  uses  in  obeying,  to  do  any  other 
thing. 

“In  animals  there  are,  therefore,  two  distinct  and 
primary  forces — instinct  and  understanding.  As  long 
as  our  conceptions  of  these  forces  were  confused,  all 


135 


our  views  and  opinions  in  regard  to  the  actions  of  ani¬ 
mals  remained  obscure  and  contradictory.  Among 
these  actions,  some  exhibited  man  every  where  superior 
to  the  brute ;  while  others  appeared  to  accord  to  the 
brute  creation  the  superiority  over  man — a  contradiction 
almost  as  deplorable  as  absurd !  By  the  distinction 
that  separates  blind  and  necessary  actions  from  elective 
and  conditional  ones — or,  in  a  word,  instinct  from  intel¬ 
ligence — all  contradiction  disappears,  and  order  suc¬ 
ceeds  to  confusion.  Whatever  in  animals  is  under¬ 
standing,  does  not  in  any  degree  approach  the  excel¬ 
lence  of  the  human  understanding;  and  whatsoever, 
under  the  appearance  of  understanding ,  seemed  supe¬ 
rior  to  the  human  understanding,  is  in  fact  a  mere  result 
of  a  mechanical  and  blind  force.”* 

Here  is  what  I  say  as  to  the  boundaries  between  the 
intelligence  of  man  and  of  animals. 

“Animals  receive,  through  their  senses,  impressions 
similar  to  those  that  we  receive  through  the  medium  of 
our  senses ;  like  ourselves,  they  retain  the  traces  of 
these  impressions  :  these  impressions,  when  preserved, 
form  for  them,  as  well  as  for  us,  numerous  and  various 
associations  :  they  combine  them,  they  draw  from  them 
inferences,  and  deduce  judgments  from  them:  there¬ 
fore  they  possess  understanding. 

“  But  the  whole  of  their  understanding  stops  at  that 
point.  The  understanding  they  possess  is  not  one  that 
can  consider  itself :  it  cannot  see  itself,  does  not  know 

*See  my  work,  De  l’instinct  et  de  l’intelligence  des  animaux, 
&c.  p.  46,  2d  edit. 


136 


itself.  They  do  not  possess  reflection ,  that  supreme 
faculty  with  which  the  mind  of  man  is  endowed,  and 
which  enables  him  to  turn  his  intellectual  power 
inwards,  so  as  to  study  and  know  the  nature  of  his  own 
understanding. 

“  Reflection,  thus  defined,  is  then  the  boundary  that 
separates  human  intelligence  from  that  of  the  brute 
creation  :  and  in  fact  it  cannot  be  denied  that  this  fur¬ 
nishes  a  strong  line  of  demarcation  between  them. 
Thought,  which  contemplates  itself;  understanding, 
which  sees  itself  and  studies  itself ;  knowledge,  which 
knows  itself ;  these  evidently  constitute  an  order  of 
determinate  phenomena  of  a  decided  character,  and  to 
which  no  brute  animal  can  ever  attain.  This  is,  if  one 
might  so  speak,  a  purely  intellectual  domain ;  and  it 
appertains  to  man  alone.  In  one  word,  animals  feel, 
know,  think ;  but  man  is  the  only  one  of  all  created 
beings  to  whom  has  been  given  the  power  of  feeling 
that  he  feels,  of  knowing  that  he  knows,  and  of  think¬ 
ing  that  he  thinks.”* 

I  will  quote,  also,  the  following  passage  from  my 
work  sur  V instinct  et  Vintelligence  dcs  animaux ,  p. 
178,  et  seq. 

44 . There  are  three  facts :  instinct,  under¬ 

standing  of  brutes ,  and  human  understanding  ;  and 
each  of  these  facts  has  its  definite  limits. 

44  Instinct  acts  without  knowing ;  understanding 
knows  in  order  to  act ;  the  human  understanding  alone 
knows,  and  knows  itself. 


*  Opus  citat.  p.  49. 


137 


“  Reflection,  closely  defined,  is  the  knowledge  of 
thought  by  thought .  And  this  power  of  thought  over 
thought  gives  us  a  whole  order  of  new  relations.  As 
soon  as  the  mind  perceives  itself  it  judges  itself;  as 
soon  as  it  can  act  upon  itself  it  is  free  ;  as  soon  as  it 
becomes  free  it  becomes  moral. 

“Man  is  only  moral  because  he  is  free. 

“  The  brute  animal  follows  its  body ;  in  the  midst 
of  this  body,  which  shrouds  it  completely  in  matter,  the 
human  mind  is  free,  and  so  free  that  it  can,  whenever 
it  prefers  to  do  so,  immolate  its  very  body. 

“  ‘  The  great  power  of  the  will  over  the  body,’  says 
Bossuet,  ‘  consists  in  this  prodigious  effect,  that  man 
is  so  completely  master  of  his  frame,  that  he  can  even 
sacrifice  it  for  the  sake  of  some  greater  good  in  view. 
To  rush  into  the  midst  of  blows,  and  plunge  into  a 
flight  of  arrows  from  a  blind  impetuosity,  as  happens 
among  brute  creatures,  shows  nothing  superior  to  the 
body  itself;  but  to  resolve  to  die  with  understanding, 
and  for  reasons,  notwithstanding  the  whole  disposition 
of  the  body  to  the  contrary,  evinces  a  principle  supe¬ 
rior  to  the  body ;  and  among  all  the  tribes  of  animals, 
man  is  the  only  one  in  whom  this  principle  exists.’  ” 

NOTE  III. 

Gall,  as  an  Observer. 

Page  93.  He  studied  them  (mankind)  in  his  own 
way ,  but  he  studied  them  very  closely. 

Gall  was  a  practical  observer.  He  observed  and 
studied  always,  and  with  so  much  the  greater  success 


138 


because  “  people  never  suspected  that  they  had  to  do 
(these  are  his  own  words)  with  a  man  who  knew  per¬ 
fectly  well  that  the  basis  of  human  character  continues 
to  be  always  the  same,  and  that  merely  the  objects  that 
interest  us  change  with  the  progress  of  years.”* 

He  examined  “families,  schools,  hospitals,  &c.”t 
And  he  never  was  satisfied  with  appearances  only. 
“  The  occupations  that  we  pursue  as  our  business,  gene¬ 
rally  prove  nothing  either  as  to  our  faculties  or  our 
propensities  :  but  those  which  we  engage  in  as  recrea¬ 
tion  are  almost  always  in  conformity  with  our  tastes 
and  our  talents. 

His  observations  on  men  were  more  serviceable  to 
him  in  judging  of  and  describing  their  characters,  than 
the  bumps  on  the  skull . 

“I  often  said  to  my  friends,  show  me  the  funda¬ 
mental  forces  of  the  soul,  and  I  will  find  the  organ  and 
the  seat  for  each  one  of  them.§  ....  When  I  had  become 
convinced  that  a  distinguished  talent,  and  one  fully  so 
recognised,  was  especially  the  work  of  nature,  I  exa¬ 
mined  the  head  of  the  individual, . &c.”|| 

Gall’s  progression,  then,  was  from  observation  to  the 
cranium;  he  first  proceeded  from  observation  to  the 
cranium ,  and  next  from  the  cranium  to  the  brain. 

Furthermore,  Gall  began  by  studying  the  physiog¬ 
nomy — the  features  of  the  countenance — like  Lavater. 

He  at  first  thought  that  a  good  memory  was  con¬ 
nected  with  a  certain  conformation  of  the  eyes :  “  I 
remarked,”  says  he,  “that  they  all  had  large  projecting 

*  T.  iii.  p.  64.  t  T.  iii.  p.  64.  X  T.  iii.  p.  64. 

$  T.  iii.  p.  58.  II  T.  iii.  p.  59. 


139 


eyes . I  suspected,  therefore,  that  there  ought 

to  exist  some  connexion  between  memory  and  this  con¬ 
formation  of  the  eyes.”*  Again  he  says,  “It  may  be 
perceived,  from  the  progress  of  these  researches,  that 
the  first  step  consisted  in  the  discovery  of  certain  or¬ 
gans  ;  that  it  was  by  degrees  only  that  we  allowed  facts 
to  speak  in  order  to  deduce  from  them  general  prin¬ 
ciples  ;  and  that  it  was  subsequently,  and  towards  the 
close,  that  we  had  learned  to  know  the  brain. ”t 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  study  of  the  brain  came 
later  than  the  doctrine ;  and  that  is  the  reason  why  the 
anatomy  of  the  brain  is  a  mere  series  of  mistakes  and 
conjectures — I  mean  here  the  special  anatomy ,  the 
secret  anatomy ,  the  phrenological  anatomy  ;  I  mean 
the  anatomy  made  out  to  suit  the  doctrine.  I  have 
already  sufficiently  discriminated  between  it  and  the 

real  anatomy. % 


NOTE  IV. 

Of  the  Animal  Spirits. 

Page  116.  He  who  is  so  intolerant  of  the  personi¬ 
fications  proposed  by  others  makes  one  personification 
more. 

Broussais  explains  every  thing  by  the  word  irrita¬ 
tion ,  just  as  Gail  explains  every  thing  by  the  word 
faculties ,  and  as  Malebranche  explained  them  by  ani¬ 
mal  spirits. 

After  serving  Descartes,  the  animal  spirits  were  in 

*  T.  i.  p.  3.  +T.i.  p.  18.  X  T.  i.  p.  64  &  67. 


140 


the  service  of  Malebranche  ;  they  served  all  the  authors 
of  the  seventeenth  century. 

Malebranche  commences  one  of  his  chapters  with 
these  words :  44  Every  body  agrees  that  the  animal 
spirits  .  .  .  He  had  no  idea  that  everybody  would 
agree  some  day,  that  the  animal  spirits  is  mere  non¬ 
sense. 

There  were  animal  spirits  of  all  sorts ;  as  Gall  had 
faculties  of  all  sorts :  there  were  agitated  t  animal 
spirits,  languid  animal  spirits. J  There  were  even 
libertine  animal  spirits. 

44  Wine  is  so  spirituous,'’  says  Malebranche,  “that  it 
is  animal  spirits  almost  completely  formed,  but  libertine 
spirits.”  § 

The  animal  spirits  seemed  to  have  become  the  ultima 
ratio  of  the  philosophers. 

The  author  of  a  book,  in  other  respects  to  be  esteemed, 
thus  defined  imagination:  “  Imagination  is  a  percep¬ 
tion  of  the  soul’s  caused  by  the  internal  motion  of  the 
animal  spirits. ”|| 

That  author  had  no  doubt  that  he  was  saying  some¬ 
thing. 

NOTE  V. 

Exaggeration  of  Broussais,  even  in  Phrenology. 

Page  120.  We  ought  to  read  that  volume  over 
again ,  and  forget  the  Cours  de  Phrenologie . 

Broussais  does  not  adopt  merely  the  general  ideas  of 
the  phrenologists — he  adopts  even  the  smallest  of  them. 


*  Dc  la  Rech.  de  la  Verite.  liv.  ii.  chap.  ii. 
§  Du  bel  esprit,  p.  80. 


tlbid.  t  Ibid. 
I!  Ibid. 


141 


Gall  had  located  the  instinct  of  murder  in  a  given 
part  of  the  brain ;  and  he  supposed,  be  it  understood, 
that  this  part  existed  only  in  the  brain  of  the  carnivo¬ 
rous  animals.  But  see,  it  is  found  in  the  brain  of  the 
herbivora ;  and  one  would  suppose  that  the  phrenolo¬ 
gists  would  be  in  trouble  about  it.  Don’t  deceive  your¬ 
self,  the  instinct  of  murder  is  the  instinct  of  destruc¬ 
tion.  Spurzheim  denominates  it  destructivity ;  and 
the  herbivorous  animals  must  possess  it,  for  they  eat 
plants  and  consequently  destroy  them. 

“  The  herbivora”  says  Broussais,  “  effect  a  real  de¬ 
struction  among  plants.*  An  attempt  has  been  made  to 
turn  these  ideas  into  ridicule,  even  in  an  Academy.  .  .  . 
It  was  in  a  learned  society  of  this  kind  considered 
ridiculous  in  the  phrenologists  to  compare  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  vegetables  to  that  of  animals.  For  my  own 
part  I  do  not  see  why  the  idea  should  be  rejected,  if 
the  fundamental  object  of  the  organ  be  to  procure  the 
means  of  alimentation,  which  seems  to  be  quite  cer¬ 
tain.”! 

Gall  imagines  an  organ  for  religion;  he  thinks  it 
peculiar  to  man,  and  denominates  it  the  Organ  of 
Theosophy.  The  same  organ  is  found  quite  down  in 
the  scale  as  low  as  the  sheep  ;i  and  do  not  suppose 
that  Broussais  is  at  all  shocked  #by  the  discovery.  If 
necessary  he  will  go  further  than  all  the  phrenologists 
taken  together. 

“  The  phrenologists”  says  he,  “  have  denied  that  this 
sentiment  (the  sentiment  of  veneration)  belongs  to  the 

*  Cours  de  Phren.  218.  t  P.221. 

X  See  M.  Leuret:  Anat.  Comp,  du  Syst.  Nerv.  &c.  1839. 


142 


animals.  I  am  not  of  that  opinion.  A  certain  shade 
of  veneration  exists  in  many  species,  among  the  ver- 
tebrata,  that  choose  their  leaders,  and  march  according 
to  a  signal  given  by  their  chiefs  and  obey  them.  Thus 
even  among  the  sheep  you  may  see  a  chief.”'* 

Who  would  have  believed  it  ?  Broussais  finds  Gall 
too  timorous. 

“  There  is,”  says  he,  “  no  central  organ.  This  is 
considered  as  one  of  the  most  powerful  objections  to 
Gall.  As  far  as  I  know  he  never  answered  it.  As  for 
me,  I  shall  be  more  frank,  perhaps  more  bold :  I  shall 
say  it  is  impossible  that  there  should  be  one,  &c.”t 

NOTE  VI. 

Contractility  of  Broussais. 

Page  126.  He  assigns  it  to  every  tissue ,  and ,  like 
them,  he  explains  every  thing  by  means  of  it. 

He  assigns  it  to  every  tissue.  Haller  attributed  this 
property  to  the  muscles  alone,  “  but  it  is  a  common 
property  of  the  tissues.”! 

He  explains  every  thing  by  means  of  it :  every 
thing,  even  innervation  itself.  But  he  is  constrained  to 
add  :  “  Doubtless  something  more  occurs  in  the  interior 
of  the  nervous  tissue ;  doubtless  we  are  unacquainted 
and  ignorant  as  to  how  that  other  thing  is  connected 
with  the  motions  in  question,  and  how  it  may  employ 
them  in  the  act  of  innervation,”  &c.§ 

*  Cours  de  Phren.  p.  350.  +  Ibid.  p.  117. 

t  De  l’Irritation  et  de  la  Folie,  p.2.  §  Ibid  p.  76. 


143 


So  we  perceive,  in  the  first  place,  contractility  ex¬ 
plains  innervation  ;  and  then,  that  something  more  is 
wanting.  And  as  nervous  contractility  is  nothing  but 
a  mental  fiction  (a  nerve  never  moves,  never  contracts , 
when  it  is  touched)  the  whole  matter  tapers  down  to 
this  something  more ,  or  to  that  other  thing . 

See  how  very  far  from  being  rigorous  are  those  who 
construct  systems. 


NOTE  VII. 

Real  Labours  of  Gall  as  to  the  Brain. 

Page  128.  Gall,  moreover,  ivas  a  great  anatomist . 

He  found  that  the  medullary  substance  of  the  brain 
was  fibrous  throughout  ;*  he  saw  the  fibres  of  the  me¬ 
dulla  oblongata  decussate  before  they  form  the  pyra¬ 
midal  eminences,!  those  of  the  corpora  olivaria,  &c.; 

*  Steno  had  already  said,  “If  the  medullary  substance  be 
every  where  fibrous,  as  in  fact,  in  most  parts  it  appears  to  be, 
you  must  confess  that  the  disposal  of  these  fibres  must  be 
arranged  with  great  skill,  since  the  whole  diversity  of  our  feel¬ 
ings  and  motions  depend  upon  them.  We  wonder  at  the  artifice 
of  the  fibres  in  each  muscle,  but  how  much  more  are  they  worthy 
of  admiration  in  the  brain,  where  these  fibres,  enclosed  within  so 
small  a  space,  perform  each  its  own  function  without  confusion 
and  without  disorder.” — Discours  sur  Vanat.  du  cerveau ,  1668. 

t  Long  before  his  time  the  same  had  been  seen  by  Mistichelli, 
Pourfour  du  Petit,  Winslow,  and  several  others,  but  it  had  been 
forgotten.  “  Each  pyramidal  body,”  says  Pourfour  du  Petit, 
“  is  divided  at  its  inferior  part  into  two  large  bundles  of  fibres, 
most  frequently  into  three,  and  in  some  instances  into  four. 
Those  of  the  right  pass  to  the  left  side,  and  those  of  the  left  pass 
to  the  right  side,  mingling  with  each  other.” — Leitre  d'un  mede- 
cin  des  hopitaux  du  Roi.  Namur  1710. 


144 


that  is  to  say,  all  the  ascending  fibres  of  the  medulla 
oblongata  across  the  pons  varolii,  thalami  nervor  opti- 
corum,  and  the  corpora  striata,  as  far  as  the  vault  of 
the  hemispheres ;  he  saw  the  bundles  formed  by  these 
fibres  increased  in  magnitude  at  each  of  these  pas¬ 
sages  ;  he  distinguished  the  fibres  which  go  out  in  order 
to  expand  in  the  hemispheres,  from  those  that  go  in  in 
order  to  give  birth  to  the  commissures :  many  nerves 
that  were  regarded  as  coming  out  immediately  from  the 
brain,  were  by  him  traced  even  into  the  medulla  ob¬ 
longata,  &c. 

And  I  repeat  that  all  these  facts,  with  the  discovery 
of  which  he  has  enriched  the  science  of  anatomy,  all 
of  them  are  the  results  of  a  happy  thought  of  his — 
the  idea  of  tracing  the  fibres  of  the  brain,  or  to  use 
a  common  expression,  of  substituting  in  the  dissection 
of  the  brain  the  method  of  developments  for  that  of 
sections . 

Those  of  Gall’s  opinions  which  it  seems  ought  not  to 
be  adopted,  are :  that  in  which  he  supposes  the  nerve 
fibres  to  be  born  (he  understands  the  word  to  the  letter) 
of  the  gray  matter ;  that  in  which  he  contends  that  the 
convolutions  of  the  brain  are  merely  foldings  of  the 
medullary  fibres,  and  can  therefore  be  ? infolded ;  that 
in  which  he  compares  the  rete  mucosum  of  the  skin 
to  the  gray  matter  of  the  encephalon,  &c.,  &c. 

Gall  had  a  mind  which  impelled  him  to  the  forma¬ 
tion  of  hypotheses  ;  and  even  in  his  real  anatomy  there 

is  a  decided  smack  of  a  system-author. 

% 

* 

THE  END. 


